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Srebrenica Report

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 53/35 (1998)

V.
EVENTS OF JANUARY 1995 TO JUNE 1995

A.
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and its collapse

¶ 175.

During the last days of 1994 there was a sustained international effort to stabilize the situation on the ground. The efforts of the SRSG were briefly joined by those of former President Carter of the United States, and culminated with representatives of the Bosnian Government and of the Bosnian Serbs concluding two agreements: a ceasefire agreement, signed on 23 December 1994 and a broader cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA), signed on 31 December 1994. The duration of the latter was intended to be four months. Two days after the signing of the COHA, the text, as negotiated by the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs, was presented to the Bosnian Croats in Mostar, who signed without seeking any amendments. Efforts were also made to bring the forces loyal to Fikret Abdiç into the agreement, but these were not successful.

¶ 176.

With the signature of the agreements, the situation in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina improved markedly for a while. Humanitarian convoys were able to move relatively freely after a period in which these had been heavily restricted. UNPROFOR was able to negotiate the re-opening of the Sarajevo blue routes in February 1995, allowing thousands of civilians every day to move relatively freely from one part of the city to another. It was also able to negotiate stronger agreements for the supply of limited amounts of gas, electricity and water to the city.

¶ 177.

Despite this improvement of the situation on the ground, there were areas of continued instability. Croat forces, which had long enjoyed a relatively stable relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, went onto the offensive against the Serbs in the Livno valley area, in the south-west of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This offensive continued methodically over the following months and culminated, on 29 July 1995, with the capture of Glamoç and Grahovo. The other area in which instability continued in spite of the cease-fire and COHA was Bihaç. In that area, forces loyal to Fikret Abdiç were reinforced by the Croatian Serbs and were able to take ground at the expense of the Fifth Corps of the ARBiH.

¶ 178.

Nor was the situation in Srebrenica stable. During the handover from Dutchbat-2 to Dutchbat-3, which formally took place on 18 January 1995, Serb forces to the west of the enclave encroached into the enclave, establishing new positions on the line that had been patrolled by Dutchbat-2. The Bosniacs urged UNPROFOR to re-establish the status quo ante. When the incoming Dutch units were unable to do so, the Bosniac commanders responded by restricting UNPROFORs access to the affected area, which became known as the Bandera triangle. On 27 January, elements of the new Dutch battalion entered the area in spite of the Bosniac warning, after which the Bosniacs held approximately 100 UNPROFOR members hostage for four days. After this, Dutchbat-3 rarely patrolled in the Bandera triangle.

¶ 179.

A further indication of the unsettled situation in Srebrenica came on 3 February, when the UNPROFOR Force Commander visited Srebrenica. He met with the Commander of Bosniac forces in the enclave, Naser Oriç, who expressed a wish to return to Sarajevo with the General by helicopter. Asked why, Oriç said that he wished to speak with President Izetbegoviç and the Bosnian Government leadership who were, in his view, preparing to negotiate away Bosniac control of Srebrenica as part of a peace deal. The UNPROFOR Force Commander was unable to accept. Oriç eventually left the enclave, never to return, in April 1995.

¶ 180.

As early as February 1995 the Serbs were beginning to further restrict the movement of international convoys to the eastern enclaves, particularly Srebrenica. Humanitarian convoys were affected, as were UNPROFOR convoys rotating troops and resupplying its forces. Apparently feeling that the movement of international land convoys, which were subject to checks by Serb forces, was preferable to air resupply, the Serbs agreed to allow some convoy movement to Srebrenica. The new Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina travelled to Srebrenica on 7 March, meeting with General Mladiç in Vlasenica on his return trip. At the meeting, General Mladiç indicated that he was dissatisfied with the safe area regime, and that he might take military action against the eastern enclaves. He also said that, should such attacks take place, he would nevertheless guarantee the safety of the Bosniac population of those areas. The UNPROFOR Commander warned him not to attack the enclaves, stating that such action would almost certainly lead to international military intervention against the Serbs. General Mladiç was dismissive.

¶ 181.

The situation in Sarajevo also began to deteriorate again at this time. Sniping incidents, which both sides had reduced for some time, began to increase. One incident, in which two Serb girls were shot and killed in the Grbavica district of Sarajevo by a Bosniac sniper in March 1995, led the Serbs to close the blue routes. The Serbs also halted the Sarajevo humanitarian airlift on 8 April, alleging that UNPROFOR was violating the agreement of 5 June 1992 under which the Serbs had agreed to give control of the airport to UNPROFOR. As the situation in Sarajevo deteriorated, UNPROFOR casualties also began to rise, particularly among the French forces, who provided the largest contingent in Sarajevo.

¶ 182.

On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate but inter-linked missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with mandates extending until 30 November 1995. Known collectively as the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF), with its headquarters in Zagreb, the three operations were under the overall command and control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Mr. Akashi). Under his authority, the Theatre Force Commander (referred to hereinafter as Force Commander) exercised overall command of military elements of the three operations, each of which had its own Commander. The operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, headquartered in Sarajevo, retained the name of UNPROFOR. (The Military Commander of United Nations forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, referred to hereinafter as the UNPROFOR Commander, continued to report directly to the Force Commander in Zagreb).

¶ 183.

By the beginning of April 1995, the situation in Sarajevo, and throughout most of the country, had returned to one of general warfare. The SRSG endeavoured, during April 1995, to negotiate an extension of the ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. All three sides, however, appeared committed to military options, and the negotiations failed. Croatian Government forces launched Operation Flash on 1 May 1995, precipitating the expulsion and flight of several thousand Croatian Serbs across the border into Serb-held territory in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and triggering a new wave of ethnic cleansing in western Bosnia, where Bosniacs and Croats were evicted to make way for the influx of displaced Serbs.

¶ 184.

As the military situation deteriorated, the Serbs further restricted access to the eastern enclaves, both for UNPROFOR and for the international humanitarian organizations. For the UNPROFOR units within the enclaves, this lack of access caused a degradation of their military capability, while for the local population the result was a further worsening of living conditions. The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed that the enclaves be resupplied by helicopter, with NATO air power to be used if the Serbs attempted to intercept any of the helicopters. His superior in Zagreb, the UNPF Theatre Force Commander, assessed that there was a considerable likelihood that the Serbs would indeed fire upon the helicopters, and thus sought the views of the Member States whose troops or air assets would be required to conduct the operation. Those States did not respond favourably.

B.
Air strikes around Sarajevo

¶ 185.

The situation in Sarajevo became a cause for particular concern. Eleven people, including both civilian and military, were killed by a Serb mortar round in the Sarajevo district of Butmir on 7 May 1995. The round had landed at the entrance to the narrow tunnel by which Bosniacs travelled out of Sarajevo to Government-held territory on Mt. Igman and beyond. During the night of 7-8 May, the shelling continued, spreading into civilian areas of Sarajevo. The UNPROFOR Commander requested that air strikes be launched at Serb positions around Sarajevo, but this request was rejected by the SRSG.

¶ 186.

The differing assessments of the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was advocating a more robust response to Serb violations of the safe areas, and the SRSG and the Theatre Force Commander, who both advocated a more cautious approach, became a matter of concern, which the Secretary-General addressed at a meeting with all three of them in Paris, on 12 May. The Secretary-General told them that he would always base his own decisions on the use of force on those of the United Nations leadership in the former Yugoslavia, but he expected to receive a consolidated, unified position. The SRSG stressed that the costs of a more robust use of force [were] high, and suggested instead that it might be more appropriate to seek a drastic reduction in the size and mandate of UNPROFOR. The Force Commander expressed his concern that UNPROFOR could, at any moment, be dragged into an escalatory military adventure -- a NATO aircraft may fire back at a radar, or air strikes could be called in a safe area. This [would] lead to hostages, and certain losses. He said that it would be an error to introduce air support to the mission in the prevailing circumstances.

¶ 187.

The Force Commander addressed some of these issues during his briefing to the Security Counil on 24 May 1995. He conveyed two concrete proposals to the Council which were intended, in his view, to decrease UNPROFORs exposure to hostage taking. One of these proposals was to withdraw the UNPROFOR battalions from the eastern enclaves, and leave only UNMOs there. The other proposal was to withdraw the Heavy Weapons Collection Points (WCPs) in the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around Sarajevo, because monitoring them was both difficult and of dubious utility, and left UNPROFOR soldiers exposed and vulnerable across the TEZ in BSA-held territory. A number of Security Council members interpreted these proposals differently. They expressed their strong concern that the UNPF leadership appeared to be averse, on principle, to using air power against the Serbs, other than in self-defence. They did not think that the peacekeeping mission would be willing to use air power in response to Serb attacks upon the safe areas; in the absence of such air support, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from the enclaves would merely expose the latter to greater danger.

¶ 188.

The situation around Sarajevo further deteriorated when, on 22 May, Serb forces removed two heavy weapons from Weapons Collection Points near the city. Bosnian Government forces then withdrew weapons of their own, and the fighting escalated. The Serbs withdrew three more heavy weapons and, on 24 May, the Special Representative made a statement emphasizing the seriousness of the situation. This was followed by a warning from the UNPROFOR Commander to both sides that they would be attacked from the air if all heavy weapons did not cease firing by 1200 hours local time the next day. A second deadline, 24 hours later, was established, before which the parties were instructed either to remove their heavy weapons from the Heavy Weapons Exclusion Zone or to place them in the Heavy Weapons Collection Points. Serb forces failed to comply, though some of their representatives later claimed that they were in the process of doing so.

¶ 189.

The SRSG authorized air strikes at 1600 hours local time on 25 May. At 1633 hours a NATO liaison officer informed the Special Representative that six NATO aircraft had attacked two ammunition bunkers in the vicinity of Pale. The Serbs again failed to comply, continuing to bombard Sarajevo. They also began retaliating against the safe areas and, in particular, against vulnerable civilian targets in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Tuzla, an air burst weapon exploded in a crowded downtown area, killing 71 people, most of them young men and women, and injuring almost 200 others. (S/1995/444, para. 12).

C.
UNPROFOR hostage crisis

¶ 190.

The Special Representative authorized a second round of air strikes the next day. Six ammunition bunkers were targeted in the same complex that had been attacked on the previous day. At this stage the Serbs took several hundred United Nations hostages -- mainly military observers and UNPROFOR military personnel stationed at the heavy weapons collection points around Sarajevo. By the afternoon of 26 May, over 400 United Nations personnel were either hostage, or were at locations on Serb-held territory from which they could not move and to which access was denied. A number of United Nations personnel were used by their Serb captors as human shields to deter further attacks on potential targets. Some of those captured were shown on Serb television, handcuffed to possible targets. Serb heavy weapons continued to fire from around Sarajevo, and from the heavy weapons collection points. The Serbs also cut the electricity supply to Sarajevo, which they largely controlled.

¶ 191.

As word of the hostage-taking reached New York, the Secretariat recommended to the SRSG that he take no further action to conduct air strikes under the UNPROFOR Commander's ultimatum, unless it was judged that a major violation had occurred in the exclusion zones, leaving no choice.

¶ 192.

Early the next morning, on 27 May, Serb forces, dressed in French uniforms and equipment, over-ran an UNPROFOR checkpoint controlling the strategic Vrbanja bridge in downtown Sarajevo. Eleven French peacekeepers were captured. Three hours later, the UNPROFOR Commander of Sector Sarajevo determined that a line had to be drawn and took the decision to respond decisively. French UNPROFOR forces counter-attacked, retaking the bridge, killing one Serb soldier and capturing three. Two French soldiers were killed, and two injured.

¶ 193.

The SRSG reported to Headquarters that the need not to further complicate the security situation in UNPROFOR was paramount. Given the threat to United Nations detainees and the determined mood of the Bosnian Serbs, he said, he had instructed the UNPROFOR Commander that, for the time being, the execution of the mandate was to be secondary to the security of United Nations personnel. The Commander passed this instruction on to his subordinates, ordering them, at the same time, to consolidate UNPROFOR positions in defensible locations, abandoning threatened positions in Serb-held territory where these could not be supported.

¶ 194.

A series of conversations took place during this period of uncertainty between General Mladiç and the UNPROFOR Commander. General Mladiç insisted that UNPROFOR should return to "United Nations principles for the creation of peace." He described the UNPROFOR Commander's willingness to call on NATO air power "crazy and unreasonable." Dr. Karadñiç wrote to the Secretary-General asking that guarantees be given by the UN and NATO countries that the use of force is no longer an option. No such guarantees were given to Karadñiç. However, the Theatre Force Commander reiterated to the UNPROFOR Commander that the release of the UNPROFOR hostages, and the security of all UNPROFOR forces in general, were his utmost priorities. Bearing in mind that the United Nations would soon be negotiating, or participating in negotiations on, the release of the hostages, the Force Commander emphasized that UNPROFOR must definitely avoid any action which could degenerate into confrontation, further escalation of tension, or the potential use of air power. His objective was to maintain political freedom to maneuovre, thus allowing the political leadership to undertake negotiations that would lead to the release of the hostages and the signing of broader agreements.

¶ 195.

The United Nations hostages were released in several groups between 2 and 18 June. Despite the public rhetoric that followed from the Serbs, the release of the hostages continued, perhaps due to the intervention of President Miloševiç, with whom a number of international actors, including the ICFY Co-Chairmen, interceded. As the release was under way, and immediately thereafter, a number of meetings took place between senior members of the international community and General Mladiç. The first of these involved the UNPF Force Commander and took place in Mali Zvornik, in Serbia, on 4 June. Further meetings with General Mladiç were held by a former UNPROFOR Force Commander (who was then serving as an Adviser to the European Union Negotiator for the former Yugoslavia) near Pale on 6 June, and again by the UNPF Force Commander on 17 and 29 June.

¶ 196.

As the news of these meetings, which had not been announced to the media, became known, reports circulated that the Force Commander had entered into an understanding with the Serbs. It was reported that the hostages were being released in return for an undertaking that NATO air power would not be used against the Serbs again. The reports also noted that President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation had subsequently said that he had been assured by President Chirac of France that the use of air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina was over. The Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Claes, wrote to the United Nations Secretary-General on 21 June, noting the public speculation that the freeing of the hostages had not been unconditional, and may have been accompanied by engagements or assurances concerning the further use of NATO air power. Mr. Claes sought clarification on this matter. The United Nations Secretary-General consulted the SRSG, who replied that neither he nor the Force Commander had given any such assurances. This message was passed on to the NATO Secretary-General.

¶ 197.

Based upon interviews conducted during the preparation of this report, it has been confirmed that the Force Commander met with General Mladiç on these three occasions in June 1995. The main purpose of the meetings was to maintain a channel of communication with the BSA, because the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina had severed contact with Mladiç, not wanting to be, or be seen conducting business with those responsible for taking troops under his command hostage. The SRSG had concurred with this line of approach, and was aware on each occasion when the UNPF Force Commander went to meet General Mladiç. The research conducted during the preparation of this report did not produce any facts suggesting that the Force Commander entered into an agreement with General Mladiç on the release of the hostages or on the interruption of the use of air power against the Serbs.

¶ 198.

General Mladiç and the UNPF Force Commander did discuss the release of the hostages at their first meeting in Mali Zvornik [on 4 June 1995], but it was apparently the former who had raised the subject. General Mladiç had prepared an agreement for the Force Commander to sign, which established a linkage between the release of the hostages and the non-use of air power against the Serbs. The Force Commander communicated in writing to United Nations Headquarters, eleven days after the meeting had taken place, and in response to a query from the Secretariat, that he had refused to sign the agreement, and had instead told General Mladiç that the Serbs behaviour (the hostage-taking) was unacceptable. He had demanded their immediate release.

¶ 199.

The objectives of the meetings with General Mladiç, from the Force Commanders perspective, were to convey and reach agreement on four main points. First, he felt it was essential for the Serbs to allow humanitarian aid to the safe areas. Second, he wanted General Mladiç to open the Sarajevo Airport. Third, he wanted to secure General Mladiçs agreement to re-supply by road the UNPROFOR troops in the enclaves. Fourth, he told Mladiç that the BSA must stop attacking civilian targets in the safe areas.

¶ 200.

The Force Commander met again with General Mladiç on 17 and 29 June. After the latter meeting, the Force Commander approached the UNHCR Chief of Mission, strongly encouraging UNHCR to accept an arrangement, proposed by General Mladiç, for convoys to be allowed into Sarajevo on the condition that equal tonnages of food be distributed to Serb communities in eastern Bosnia. According to UNHCR, the Force Commander argued that accepting this arrangement, which UNHCR felt to be inequitable, would open a window of opportunity for political negotiations then being conducted by the European Unions Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia (Mr. Carl Bildt -- Lord Owens successor). The UNHCR Chief of Mission refused, and UNHCR has since stated that it felt that it was being bullied by UNPF.

D.
The report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444)

¶ 201.

As the hostage crisis was unfolding the Secretary-General presented a major report to the Security Council, in which he addressed the broad themes of the mandate, the attitudes of the parties and the security and safety of UNPROFOR. (S/1995/444, para. 3) Closely argued over 24 pages, the report included an extended discourse on the reasons for the United Nations not to use force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General objected to the use of force, other than in self-defence, on three grounds: as a practical matter, because of restrictions in the mandate and as a point of principle.

¶ 202.

Referring to the practical problems of UNPROFOR using force, the Secretary-General argued as follows:

The question of whether UNPROFOR is about peacekeeping or enforcement is not one that can be avoided ... Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel ... Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other. (para. 62).

¶ 203.

The Secretary-General noted that, when UNPROFOR had used force against the Serbs other than in self-defence, the Serb side quickly realized that it had the capacity to make UNPROFOR pay an unacceptably high price, particularly by taking hostages. He felt that the episodes in which UNPROFOR had used air power had demonstrated the perils of crossing the line from peacekeeping to peace enforcement without first equipping the Force with the manpower, armament, logistic and intelligence capacity and command and control arrangements that would give the necessary credibility to its threat to use force by showing that it had the ability to respond decisively to any hostile action. (para. 63).

¶ 204.

Moving from practical reasons not to use force to legal ones, the Secretary-General gave his interpretation of the relevant section of Security Council resolution 836 (1993). Resolution 836 (1993) referred to Chapter VII, but paragraph 9 defined the parameters for the use of force as being in self defence and the mandate given to UNPROFOR did not include any provision for enforcement. This view appears to be at variance with earlier directives to UNPROFOR from the Secretariat that air power could be used in self-defence, and also in reply to bombardments against the safe areas, in response to armed incursions into the safe areas, and to neutralize attempts to obstruct the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR forces or humanitarian convoys (see para 111). This broader interpretation was not explicitly endorsed by the Security Council.

¶ 205.

Concluding his arguments against the use of force, the Secretary-General made a final statement of principle, referring to three interconnected objectives, which represent the very essence of the United Nations: the quest for peace, the protection of human life and the rejection of a culture of death. These objectives will take time to attain and they will be attained only through the successful use of non-military methods. (para. 80)

¶ 206.

The Secretary-General presented the Council with four options for the way forward:

Option A: To withdraw UNPROFOR, leaving at the most a small political mission, if that was the wish of the parties;

Option B: To retain UNPROFORs existing tasks and the methods used to implement them;

Option C: To change the existing mandate to permit UNPROFOR to make greater use of force;

Option D: To revise the mandate so that it would include only those tasks that a peace-keeping operation could reasonably be expected to perform in the circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¶ 207.

The Secretary-General made it clear that he opposed options A, B and C, favouring instead an arrangement under which the UNPROFOR would abandon any actual or implied commitment to the use of force to deter attacks against the safe areas, and under which force, including air power, would be used only in self-defense.

¶ 208.

The Secretary-General recognized that the safe areas were often violated, but argued that the only effective way to make the safe areas, as well as other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, truly safe, pending a comprehensive political solution achieved through negotiations, is to define a regime acceptable to both parties ... (para. 41). He repeated his views, laid out in full in a report six months earlier, that all the safe areas should be demilitarized. He did not, however, address the concern, expressed by many, including the High Commissioner for Refugees and the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the eastern enclaves would not be safe from Serb attacks under any circumstances, because the occupation of those territories was central to Serb war aims.

¶ 209.

Once again, the Security Council was divided on how to respond to the Secretary-Generals assessment of the deficiencies in the safe area policy and on his proposed adjustments to it. As a result, it did not respond at all.

E.
Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo and its consequences for the United Nations

¶ 210.

The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) undertook a significant restructuring exercise during the first half of 1995. The ARBiH, with approximately 200,000 men in uniform, had long enjoyed an advantage in manpower over the BSA, particularly in light infantry. UNPROFOR and other observers assessed, however, that this advantage had been offset by BSA advantages not only in heavy weapons and materiel, but also in command, control, communications, intelligence, discipline, logistics and other areas where the Serbs could fall back on a large cadre of professional military officers. The ARBiH reorganization of early 1995 went some way towards redressing the weaknesses of that force.

¶ 211.

Bosniac leaders made a number of public statements in the Spring of 1995, to the effect that Sarajevo would not endure another winter under siege. The reorganized ARBiH began a series of attacks aimed at breaking out of Sarajevo on 16 June, across the narrow belt of surrounding Serb-held territories, intending to connect the city to the main body of Government-held territory to the north and west. Sarajevo-based units attacking out of the city were joined by forces from central Bosnia attacking the Serb cordon from outside. Government forces took some ground in the early stages of the offensive, but were then thrown back with relative ease by the Serbs, sustaining heavy casualties.

¶ 212.

In response to the Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo, which had been in violation of Security Council resolution 913 (1994), the Serbs stopped almost all movement into and out of the city, including that of humanitarian aid. Fearing a humanitarian disaster in the city, UNPROFOR and UNHCR activated a plan to bring humanitarian assistance into Sarajevo without the consent of the Serbs. The UNPROFOR Commander had presented the plan for this operation to the Force Commander in May, when the situation was less dire. It had been rejected by the Force Commander at the beginning of June, however, on the grounds that it was too confrontational. In the face of a worsening humanitarian situation, the plan was later approved. Beginning on 2 July, United Nations convoys bringing aid from the Croatian coast travelled over Mt. Igman and across Sarajevo airport and into the city. The convoys were exposed to direct fire from Serb positions for several kilometres and were obliged, on the final approaches to the city, to pass within several hundred metres of the Serb front lines. Serb forces engaged the convoys, causing UNPROFOR to fire back with light and heavy weapons.

F.
The Rapid Reaction Force

¶ 213.

Mindful, in the wake of the hostage crisis, of the need to have greater protection for their troops on the ground, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom announced their intention to contribute troops to an international 'theatre reserve' or 'rapid reaction force', to give UNPROFOR a capacity for more robust action. The sense that a ground force option was needed was reinforced on 2 June when a United States F-16 aircraft, on routine patrol in Bosnia and Herzegovinas air space, was brought down by a Serb anti-aircraft missile. European and NATO Defence Ministers met in Paris on 3 June to discuss the composition, deployment and mandate of such a force. It was agreed that the new force would comprise two heavily armed brigades, drawn principally from France and the United Kingdom, but also including significant elements from the Netherlands.

¶ 214.

Meeting in Paris, the United Nations representatives, the Co-Chairman of ICFY (Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg) and the Force Commander, insisted that the new force should operate under peacekeeping rules of engagement. Concern was expressed about the possibility that, bolstered by the new force, UNPROFOR might find itself "being sucked into the war," or that it might slide into peace enforcement. The Force Commander stressed that, even with the new Force, UNPROFOR should not be expected to open and secure corridors to the safe areas. Writing to United Nations Headquarters, the SRSG also expressed scepticism about the new force. He said that the theatre reserve, while improving considerably UNPROFORs ability to respond to local incidents, would not alter the overall force ratios on the ground. Military constraints, the SRSG argued, as well as the mandate and rules of engagement, required that UNPROFOR should continue to rely on negotiations as the initial and primary response to incidents on the ground. He said that the new force should avoid undertaking activities to which the parties, as a matter of policy, were opposed. He was particularly concerned that the theatre reserve should not be employed, in the absence of fundamental consent, to hold open routes to Sarajevo and other enclaves, to guarantee the safety of the Sarajevo airport, to force aid over long distances, or to compel the parties to comply with exclusion zones or other agreements. The Secretariat shared the SRSGs concerns and his view of how the Rapid Reaction Force should be used.

¶ 215.

The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, viewed matters differently, arguing that the new force should be used to help implement the UNPROFOR mandate. In the absence of any willingness of his superiors to use the force for fighting and directly implementing the mandate, he said that he would prefer not to have it at all. At the same time, he was seeking to avoid future hostage-taking by the Serbs, removing as many UNPROFOR troops as possible from Serb-held territory.

¶ 216.

The differences between the Force Commander in Zagreb and the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina grew increasingly open, and on 9 June, the SRSG convened a meeting in Split with both of them. According to the notes of the meeting, the Force Commander stated that confrontations with Serbs should be avoided, so that the political process could begin. He opined that the Serbs did not appear to want to provoke a crisis, and instead sought to modify their behaviour to be more acceptable interlocutors. He said that the Serbs were seeking two things, international recognition and a softening of the blockade on the Drina. Speaking of the Rapid Reaction Force, the Force Commander stated that it could help UNPROFOR with self-defence, but it could not open corridors to Srebrenica, Gorañde or even Sarajevo. The SRSG agreed with the Force Commanders assessment, stressing that the Rapid Reaction Force should be used according to peacekeeping principles, using force only in self-defense. He also opposed the name Rapid Reaction Force which, he felt, was too confrontational, preferring instead the term Theatre Reserve. The Secretariat did not agree with the proposal to change the name, but did concur with the SRSGs concerns that it not be used as an offensive weapon.

¶ 217.

The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that the only use for the Rapid Reaction Force would be to open corridors to the Bosniac-held enclaves, including not only Sarajevo, but also Srebrenica, ðepa and Gorañde. He repeated that, if there was no political backing to use the Rapid Reaction Force to open such corridors, he would rather not have it at all. The Force Commander insisted that the United Nations could not impose a solution, such as a corridor, and that UNPROFOR could only achieve that through political negotiation. The UNPROFOR Commander replied that he saw no prospects of the parties agreeing to such routes, and that it would be a waste of time to even attempt to negotiate such a deal. He said that UNPROFOR would have to be prepared to fight, otherwise it would always be stared down by the Serbs." The Force Commander did not necessarily disagree in principle, but he believed that UNPROFOR did not have the means to do so.

¶ 218.

Throughout June 1995, the discussion over the use of the Rapid Reaction Force continued. The Secretariat briefed representatives of the troop-contributing nations on 12 June, telling them that the Force Commander was very conscious of the dividing line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and [had] no intention to cross it. The SRSG reported to New York that it remained the assessment of the UNPF Force Commander that the addition of one mortar battery on Mount Igman, and the availability of one mechanized infantry battalion with two batteries of artillery, did not provide sufficient tactical superiority in the Sarajevo area to hold open a corridor.

¶ 219.

The SRSG, conveying what he considered to be the shared views of the Force Commander and the Secretariat, wrote to Dr. Karadñiç on 19 June, as follows:

I wish to assure you that these theatre reserve forces will operate under the existing United Nations peace-keeping rules of engagement and will not in any way change the essential peace-keeping nature of the UNPROFOR mission. While the reserve will enhance UNPROFORs security, the understanding and cooperation of the parties themselves will be the best guarantor of the Forces continued effectiveness as an impartial force.

The Permanent Representative of the United States issued a statement protesting this letter, stating that, The method, timing and substance of this letter are highly inappropriate.

¶ 220.

On 6 July, the day the Serb attack on Srebrenica began, the Secretariat met again with troop contributors, repeating that the Rapid Reaction Force would not be used for peace enforcement. The Force would be used to assist UNPROFOR forces to carry out their peacekeeping mandate. The Force will not have any function outside of this role.

G.
Fighting around Srebrenica

¶ 221.

The military situation in and around Srebrenica had been generally calm since the agreements of 18 April 1993 and 8 May 1993. During the two years between May 1993 and May 1995, neither side had made any significant attempt to capture territory. There was, however, constant friction between the Bosniacs and the Serbs as to the exact borders of the enclave, which had been exacerbated by the fact that UNPROFOR had apparently misplaced a map that had been agreed between the parties on 8 May 1993. There were frequent exchanges of small-arms fire in the disputed areas and occasional efforts by the Serbs to push the line of actual control inward, as had happened in January 1995 during the rotation of Dutch forces. The Bosniacs vigorously accused UNPROFOR of having abandoned strategic territory to the Serbs.

¶ 222.

Limited fighting around the Srebrenica enclave had also been associated with the movement of Bosniacs between the enclaves of Srebrenica and ðepa. Bosniacs moved frequently across the narrow belt of land separating the enclaves, and these Bosniac parties would occasionally be intercepted by Serb patrols, with whom they would exchange fire. There were also exchanges of fire associated with the helicopter flights which were operated by the Bosniac authorities between ðepa and the main body of Bosniac-held territory some 50 km to the west. In one incident, in May 1995, Serb forces succeeded in shooting down a Bosniac helicopter near ðepa, after which the flights were suspended.

¶ 223.

In June 1995 the period of relative military inactivity came to an end. On 1 June a Serb raiding party entered the enclave, ambushed and reportedly killed a number of Bosniac civilians. On the same day, the BSA instructed UNPROFOR to move Observation Post Echo, an UNPROFOR position on the southern boundary of the enclave, in order to give the Serbs unrestricted use of a strategic road just south of the enclave. UNPROFOR refused to relocate, and on 3 June the Serbs attacked the position with hand-held weapons, mortars and anti-tanks weapons. OP Echo was surrendered, despite the Dutchbat Commanders request for close air support to defend it. The request did not reach UNPF Headquarters in Zagreb, but appears to have been discouraged further down the chain of command, bearing in mind that hundreds of UNPROFOR personnel remained hostage. The Dutch battalion nevertheless established two new positions, known as OPs Sierra and Uniform, next to where OP Echo had been located. The Serbs were taken aback by the move. Moreover, following the capture by the Serbs of OP Echo, Dutchbat agreed to certain measures which seemed to acknowledge that the demilitarization agreements of 1993 were no longer functioning. They agreed that the Bosniacs could carry weapons openly and that they could occupy positions between the UNPROFOR OPs, but not immediately in front or behind them, as such a move might endanger UNPROFOR personnel. It appears that these decisions were taken locally, unbeknownst to UNPF Headquarters.

¶ 224.

The Bosniac leadership within the safe area of Srebrenica was divided as to how to deal with the Serb attack on OP Echo and with what they perceived to be UNPROFORs inability, or unwillingness, to maintain the perimeter of the enclave. A majority of the members of the Srebrenica War Presidency (comprised of its civilian and military leaders) appears to have favoured the maintenance of a relatively passive posture. At a special session of the War Presidency, however, the late Ramiz Beçiroviç, Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, stated that he had received an instruction from the General Headquarters of the ARBiH, relayed through ARBiH 2nd Corps Headquarters in Tuzla, to conduct diversionary attacks outside the Srebrenica enclave, to draw Serb forces away from the Sarajevo front. He showed a copy of the order to those present, who have since confirmed its contents. Several members of the Srebrenica War Presidency expressed the view that it was mistaken to undertake any military activities which the Serbs could use as a pretext for further attacks of their own.

¶ 225.

In response to the order, a raiding party of Bosniacs, under the leadership of Zulfo Tursunoviç, attacked the Serb village of Višnjica, 5 km west of the western edge of the Srebrenica enclave. During the attack in the early morning of 26 June, several houses were burned, and either two people were killed, according to Bosniac sources, or four, according to Serb sources. (Approximately 100 sheep were also stolen and taken back to Srebrenica, where they were subsequently eaten). The attack, although relatively minor in comparison to the Serb attacks which preceded it, led to strong Serb condemnations. Serb army spokesman Milutinoviç stated that it was the job of UNPROFOR to prevent such operations, and that the attack therefore demonstrated that the UN forces are aligning themselves with the Muslim army. General Mladiç stated to UNPROFOR that Bosniac attacks from Srebrenica brutally violate the status of the Safe Area of Srebrenica. Due to that fact, I strongly protest and warn you that we will not tolerate such cases in the future. Mladiç failed to mention what UNPF had reported to United Nations Headquarters three days prior to the raid on Višnjica, namely that the BSA had apparently fired 20 shells into Srebrenica town, killing one woman and injuring another two civilians.



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