It is now some
years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from
my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I
had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was
convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself
of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to
build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any
firm and permanent structure in the sciences. But
as this enterprise appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I
had attained an age so mature that I could not hope that at any later
date I should be better fitted to execute my design. This
reason caused me to delay so long that I should feel that I was doing
wrong were I to occupy in deliberation the time that yet remains to me
for action. To-day, then, since very opportunely
for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care
[and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured for
myself an assured leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last
seriously and freely address myself to the general upheaval of all my
former opinions. (Note
1)
Now for this object it is not
necessary that I should show that all of these are false -- I shall
perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already
persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from
matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those
which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in
each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my
rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I
should examine each in particular, which would be an endless
undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the
foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of
the edifice, I shall only in the first place
attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested.
(Note 2)
All that up to
the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have
learned either from the senses or through the senses; but it is
sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is
wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been
deceived. (Note 3)
But it may be that although the senses
sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible,
or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which
we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognise them by
their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by
the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands
and other similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and
this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to
certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and
clouded by the violent vapours of black bile, that they constantly
assure us that they think they are kings when they are really quite
poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without
covering, or who imagine that they have an earthenware head or are
nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But
they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to follow
examples so extravagant. (Note
4)
At the same time
I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am in the
habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same
things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are
insane in their waking moments. (Note
5) How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that
I found myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated
near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this
moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am
looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that
it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and
perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so
distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself
that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar
illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so
manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may
clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in
astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of
persuading me that I now dream.
Now let us assume that we are asleep
and that all these particulars, e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our
head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false delusions; and let us
reflect that possibly neither our hands nor our whole body are such as
they appear to us to be. At the same time we must at least confess
that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted
representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of
something real and true, and that in this way those general things at
least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are not imaginary
things, but things really existent. For, as a matter of fact,
painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to represent
sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot
give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain
medley of the members of different animals; or if their imagination is
extravagant enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar
has ever before been seen, and that then their work represents a thing
purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same
that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily real. And
for the same reason, although these general things, to wit, [a body],
eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at
the same time to confess that there are at least some other objects
yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of
these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these
images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or
false and fantastic, are formed.
To such a class of things pertains
corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended
things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in
which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on.
That is possibly why our
reasoning is not unjust when we conclude from this that Physics,
Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which have as their end the
consideration of composite things, are very dubious and uncertain; but
that Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only
treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking
great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not,
contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable.
For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form
five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does
not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected
of any falsity [or uncertainty]. (Note
6)
Nevertheless I
have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God
existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how do I know
that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven,
no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless [I
possess the perceptions of all these things and that] they seem to me
to exist just exactly as I now see them? And, besides, as I sometimes
imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think
they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I
add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things
yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly
God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to
be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary
to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself,
it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be
sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does
permit this. (Note
7)
There may indeed be those who would
prefer to deny the existence of a God so powerful, rather than believe
that all other things are uncertain. But let us not oppose them for
the present, and grant that all that is here said of a God is a fable;
nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have arrived at the
state of being that I have reached -- whether they attribute it to
fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a continual succession
of antecedents, or by some other method -- since to err and deceive
oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the
probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is
the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these
reasons I have certainly nothing to reply, but at the end I
feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I
formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt,
and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for
reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that
henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving
credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if
I desire to arrive at any certainty [in the sciences]. (Note
8)
But it is not
sufficient to have made these remarks, we must also be careful to keep
them in mind. For these ancient and commonly held opinions
still revert frequently to my mind, long and familiar custom having
given them the right to occupy my mind against my inclination and
rendered them almost masters of my belief; nor will I ever lose the
habit of deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them, so
long as I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some
measure doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly
probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny
them. That is why I consider that I shall not be
acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow
myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these
opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus
balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that they cannot
divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my judgment
will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right
knowledge of the truth. For I am assured that there can be neither
peril nor error in this course, and that I cannot at present yield too
much to distrust, since I am not considering the question of action,
but only of knowledge. (Note
9)
I shall then
suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth,
but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed
his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens,
the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are
nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed
himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider
myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any
senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I
shall remain obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means
it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may
at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with
firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being
imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he
may be. (Note 10)
But this task is a laborious one, and insensibly a certain lassitude
leads me into the course of my ordinary life. And just as a captive
who in sleep enjoys an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect
that his liberty is but a dream, fears to awaken, and conspires with
these agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged, so
insensibly of my own accord I fall back into my former opinions, and I
dread awakening from this slumber, lest the laborious wakefulness
which would follow the tranquillity of this repose should have to be
spent not in daylight, but in the excessive darkness of the
difficulties which have just been discussed.
last update: Jun 19 2003