en politieke
ideeën in de Vita
Apollonii van Philostratus.
Doctoral dissertation
University of Nijmegen
(Groningen 1993).
Table of Contents & Summary
The Dutch-language
version of Power,
Paideia &
Pythagoreanism
(Amsterdam, Gieben: 1995) was published in 1993 by Styx Publications in
Groningen; it was my doctoral dissertation, supervised by Lukas de
Blois, Professor of Ancient History at the University of Nijmegen. In
the Netherlands,
dissertations written in Dutch have to contain a summary in a language
accessible to an international readership. Since at the time I did not
know whether I would receive a translation grant, I wrote a
fifteen-page summary in English (pp. 307-321). The publication, in 1995, of the
translation by Peter Mason made the summary redundant as a device to
bring my dissertation
to the attention of an international readership. However, it may still
come
in handy for those who think a 240-page monograph on the Life of Apollonius
a bit too much of a good thing; and it may also be helpful to
people who
want to complement a partial reading of the book by perusal of a
synopsis. Therefore, I have decided to put it online, even though I
must ask the
reader for his or her clemency, because it was my first extended
exercise in English prose composition. Superfluous to say that
things such as references and bibliography are almost completely
missing. For those see
the book. The summary of the Dutch-language version is preceded by the table of contents of the English version. Probably the most controversial
part of my findings was (and still is) the conclusion that 'Damis' - the
disciple of Apollonius whose memoirs Philostratus claims to have had
access to - was not a Philostratean invention, but a second- or early
third-century pseudepigraphon.
This position is in contradiction with an almost complete scholarly
consensus that 'Damis' is a literary fiction, a view powerfully argued
by Ewen Bowie [in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt
II 16.2 (Berlin/New York 1978), 1652-1699]. The main arguments I have
adduced for my position are listed in the final paragraph of the
summary. To the best of my knowledge, only the first of these has been
taken notice of, among others by Harry Sidebottom [Classical Review 49 (1999), 34, disagreeing with my conclusion] and by Carlo M. Lucarini [Studi Ellenictici 16 (2005), 333 n. 70]. I would like to suggest that especially the last argument mentioned in the summary deserves
more attention than it has received so far. In fact, more than anything
else it were the observations underlying this argument which made me
question the correctness of the idea that the information for which
Philostratus refers to 'Damis' is the product of his own
imagination: (i) the Indian episode of the Life of Apollonius
displays a conception of the relation between king and sage that is
absent from Greek literature (Greek literature on India included)
until
the early third century CE, the sage being the object of religious
worship by his king; (ii) in the early third century this
conception
emerges almost simultaneously in the Life of Apollonius and in Bardaiṣan's Indica;
(iii) Philostratus refers to 'Damis' for the scene
exemplifying this conception (III 27); (iv) Bardaiṣan referred for his
information on India to an Indian embassy which was on its way to the
emperor Elagabalus; (v) later in the third century the conception makes
an appearance in Porphyry's Homeric Questions.
For people interested in the
history of ideas this is an interesting plot,
and it seems to me that the proponents of the
Meyer-Bowie-hypothesis should try to offer some kind of solution to it.
After all, in the debate on the sources of the Life
arguments based on the history of ideas do not necessarily have to
yield to arguments based on hypothetical reconstructions of literary
technique.
Presenting an up-to-date
bibliography on the Life of Apollonius would be quite time-consuming. Suffice it to mention that two volumes of papers, on the Life of Apollonius and on Philostratus respectively, have just been published: Kristoffel Demoen, Danny Praet (eds), ΘΕΙΟΣ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. Essays on Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii (Leiden: Brill 2009);
Ewen Bowie, Jas Elsner
(eds), Philostratus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2009). A lot of good information on Apollonius of Tyana can be
found on the internet, thanks to Jona Lendering, who has put online Conybeare's 1912 Loeb translation of Philostratus' Life of Apollonius as well as articles on both the author and the main character.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
[1]
CHAPTER 1. THE WRITER
[5]
The Philostrati and
their literary production [5]
The problems [5]; The corpus [5]; Philostratus I
[6]; Philostratus of Lemnos (III) [10];
Philostratus IV [11];
W. Schmid's hypothesis [11]; K. Münscher's
hypothesis [11]; The
views of F. Solmsen and G. Anderson [12]; The letters
[12]; Conclusions
[13]
Biographical information
[15]
Youth and education [15]; Hoplite general in Athens
[16]; The Roman years [19]; Julia Domna [22]; Travelling with the
Severan court
[24]; The date of the VA
[25]; Philostratus after Julia Domna's death
[26]; The date of the VS
[26]; Summary [27]
Paideia and political power: the
mentality of a sophist [29]
Philostratus' cultural ideal [29]; The beginning of
the Second Sophistic in Philostratus' view [32]; Sophists in public
functions
[34]; Philostratus' mentality: sophistic, social status and political
activities [35]; Philostratus' mentality: sophists and emperors [38];
Culture
and politics: transgressing the dividing line [45]; The Classical
themes of
historical meletai:
the self-awareness of the Greek elites and their
attitude towards Rome [48]; Greek identity between politics and culture
[50]
CHAPTER 2. THE MAIN
CHARACTER [52]
Introduction: Apollonius
as Proteus [52]
The Vita Apollonii:
a survey of the contents [54]
Philostratus' Apollonius
[60]
The apologetic programme of the VA
[60]; The
ontological status of the main character [62]; Philostratus' attitude
towards
magic [64]; Philostratus' attitude towards his hero [65]
The sources of the Vita
Apollonii [67]
Local traditions [67]; Maximus of Aegae [68];
Moeragenes [69]; Apollonius' letters [70]; The contacts of the main
character
with Musonius Rufus, Demetrius and Scopelian [74]; Other writings by
Apollonius
[76]; The hypothetical biography of Pythagoras by Apollonius [77]
; 'Damis'
[79]; Conclusions [88]
CHAPTER 3. GREEK
SELF-AWARENESS IN THE VITA APOLLONII [89]
Introduction [89]
Greek identity [90]
The contents of Greek identity [90]; Admonitions to
maintain Greek identity [92]; Wisdom and the love of freedom [98];
References
to the Classical past [99]
The omnipresence of
Greek civilisation [101]
The Hellenizing view of India [101]; Criticisms of Greek culture by
non-Greeks
[103]
Problems of civic life
[107]
The stasis typology of the author of the VA
[107]; Objections to public entertainment [107]; Objections to
unwarranted
pride in urban appearances [108]; Intervening in situations of acute
conflict:
baths and bread [109]; Disquisitions on civic life [112]
Greek self-awareness and
Roman rule [117]
The VA on Roman rule [117]; Acceptance and
appreciation of Roman rule, no identification with Rome [118];
Criticisms of
the exercise of Roman rule at the provincial level [120]; The selection
of
governors [122]; Nero's 'liberation of Greece' [124]
CHAPTER 4. PHILOSOPHERS
AND RULERS IN THE VITA APOLLONII
[128]
Introduction [128]
Roman emperors in the Vita
Apollonii [130]
Nero [130]; The end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and
the year of the three emperors [134]; The establishment of the Flavian
dynasty:
Vespasian in Alexandria [136]; Titus in Tarsus [145]; The Domitian
episode [147]; Conclusions [157]
Philosopher and ruler:
two complementary roles [162]
Philosopher and ruler in the VA [162]; The
conception of the philosopher as an opponent of the tyrant: a
historical sketch
[165]; The conception of the philosopher as an opponent of the tyrant
in the
Apollonius tradition and in the VA [169]; The conception of the
philosopher as a counsellor of the good monarch: a historical sketch
[171]; The
origin of the conception of the religious veneration of the sage by the
king
[176]; Porphyry on Pythagorean views of the relation between the sage
and the
king [181]; The ontological status of the king in Greek political
thought of
the Hellenistic and Imperial periods [182]; The main character of the
VA
as a prophet of changes on the throne and as a 'kingmaker' -- is
there a connection with the religious veneration of the sage by the
king?
[189]; The conception of the philosopher as a counsellor of the good
monarch in
the Apollonius tradition and in the VA [190]; Conclusions [193]
Apollonius'
recommendations [194]
The constitutional debate before Vespasian (VA V 33-35) [194]; The practical value of a philosopher's advice for a
monarch
[205]; Apollonius' speech on the exercise of monarchic power (VA V 36)
[208]
The topicality of
Apollonius' recommendations [217]
J. Göttsching's interpretation: advice to Severus
Alexander [217]; A. Calderini: an alternative dating [218];
F.W. Lenz: a 'Fürstenspiegel' [219]; Topical allusions in the
VA
[220]; E.M. Schtajerman's interpretation: Die Krise der
Sklavenhalterordnung
[221]; L. de Blois: The third-century crisis and the
Greek elite
in the Roman empire [224]; Conclusion: Philostratus' selective
perception
of contemporary phenomena in connection with his mentality -- the
hero of the VA and the Greek self-awareness of the author [227]
CONCLUSIONS [231]
ABBREVIATIONS [241]
EDITIONS OF ANCIENT
AUTHORS [242]
BIBLIOGRAPHY [244]
INDEX OF SOURCES [255]
INDEX OF PERSONS [270]
Summary
The subject of this
study, as presented in the Introduction, is the early-third-century
author Philostratus’ portrayal, in his Life
of Apollonius, of the first-century miracle worker and Pythagorean sage
from Tyana as a ‘philosopher involved in politics’, who intervened in
civic
conflicts in the cities of the eastern half of the Roman empire,
advising their
citizens how to live together, and established contacts with emperors
and
kings. My aim has been to analyze the elements which comprised this
aspect of
Philostratus’ image of the Tyanean sage, and the main question I have
asked is
to what extent these elements were actually present in
pre-Philostratean
traditions on Apollonius. To prevent any misunderstanding at this
point, I
should stress that I am not interested in the historical credibility of
Philostratus’ account of Apollonius’ vicissitudes. The reliability of
the
references of the author to a wide range of sources on the
first-century
Pythagorean is, in contrast, an issue one can hardly evade. Moreover,
it is an
issue which a thorough investigation of Philostratus’ account of
Apollonius’
contact with cities, and especially monarchs, could still serve to
clarify
further, despite decades of scholarly debate and the loss of the
greater part
of the pre-Philostratean traditions on Apollonius. I have tried to make
a
reasonable case for the reliability of Philostratus’ claims concerning
the
sources he used, and to demonstrate how he may have elaborated elements
taken
from these sources in his portrayal of Apollonius as an adviser of
cities, a
counsellor of good monarchs, and an opponent of tyrants. In order to do
so, it
was necessary to gain an understanding of the author’s outlook as well
as of
the character and development of second-century traditions on
Apollonius. The
insights I was able to acquire on these subjects are discussed in the
first two
chapters, The writer
and The main character.
The third and fourth
chapters, Greek
Self-awareness and Philosophers
and Rulers, focus on the
conduct of Philostratus’ hero towards his fellow Greeks and his contact
with
monarchs.
The first section of
the first chapter, The
Philostrati and their literary production,
reviews the problems around the genealogical relations between
different
authors of the same name and the distribution of the surviving
Philostratean
corpus among them. G.W. Bowersock’s arguments for the credibility of
the
Suda’s information on the sophistic
status and the literary output of the father of the author who wrote
the Life of Apollonius and the Lives of the Sophists are questionable.
So
far, W. Schmid has offered the most viable solution to the problem of
the
genealogical relations between the author of the Life
of Apollonius and the Lives
of the Sophists (referred to as Philostratus II in this
paragraph), the
Lemnian Philostratus mentioned in the Lives
of the Sophists, and the author of the second Imagines.
According to Schmid, the Lemnian Philostratus was the son
of a cousin of Philostratus II, whereas the author of the second Imagines was born from the marriage
between the Lemnian and a daughter of Philostratus II. A corollary to
this
solution was Schmid’s belief that from the surviving Philostratean
corpus only
the letter on epistolary style (Dial.
1) and the second Imagines were not
by Philostratus II. The German scholar tried to prove his case by an
exhaustive
demonstration of the linguistic and stylistic uniformity of the works
he
ascribed to Philostratus II. F. Solmsen, though sceptical of the value
of
Schmid’s argumentation, reached the same conclusion on the authorship
of the
different parts of the corpus. Much like G. Anderson, I prefer Schmid
and Solmsen’s solution to K. Münscher’s opinion as a hypothesis.
Especially as
far as the Nero and the Gymnasticus are concerned, there seems
to be little room for doubt about the authorship of Philostratus II.
The second section of
the first chapter, Biographical
Information, explores the literary
and epigraphic evidence in order to draw a sketch of the life of
Philostratus
II (referred to simply as Philostratus in the remainder of this
summary). An
Athenian and Roman citizen born around 170, presumably on Lemnos, Flavius Philostratus received
rhetorical instruction from several sophists. The only one he
explicitly calls
his teacher is Proclus of Naucratis; other sophists mentioned as his
teachers
in scholarly literature are insufficiently documented. A period of
training was
followed by several years of sophistic activity in Athens. Probably he and the Lucius
Flavius
Philostratus who served as a member of the boulē
and hoplite general in the first decade of the third century are one
and the
same; the tenure of these functions can tentatively be dated to the
years
200/201-205/6. During the following decades, several members of the
family held
high civic offices in Athens, Erythrae, and on Lemnos. In the next generation the
family
produced members of the senatorial order. Around 205, Philostratus
moved to Rome, where he was introduced into
the
Severan court and became a member of Julia Domna’s circle. A common
opinion
about the composition of this circle, which goes back to Münscher, is
ill-founded: instead of interpreting the geōmetrai
mentioned in VS 622 as astrologers,
we should understand Philostratus’ characterization of Julia’s circle
as
referring to sophists and to philosophers of Platonic or Pythagorean
beliefs.
In the period preceding Julia’s death in 217 Philostratus presumably
stayed at
the court, following the imperial family in its wanderings. In the
years
following, he disappears, but turns up again in the 320’s or 330’s,
when he
lived in Athens and moved in prominent
cultural and political circles. During these
years he must have been working on the Lives
of the sophists. As has been convincingly demonstrated by I.
Avotins, the Lives were dedicated
to
Gordian senior during his proconsulate of Africa in 237/8. The Life
of Apollonius, commissioned by Julia Domna, was completed
after the empress’ death, while the reference in VS
570 gives 238 as a terminus ante quem.
The third
section of the first chapter, Paideia and
Political Power: The Mentality
of a sophist, deals with Philostratus’ cultural ideal and
offers a survey
of statements in the Lives of the
Sophists on the relationship between sophistic achievement,
social status,
and political careers. The identification of the author with the
virtuosos
orators whose accomplishments he describes, and, therefore, the central
importance of the Lives of the Sophists
as a source for Philostratus’ outlook, have to be upheld against A.
Brancacci’s
contention that Philostratus did not want to be confused with these
declaimers
and preferred the ‘philosopher-sophist’ as a cultural model.
We
can identify two possibly significant reasons to explain why
Philostratus, even
though tracing back the origins of the Second Sophistic to the fourth
century
BCE, actually pinpointed the start of this movement to Nicetes of
Smyrna in the
second half of the first century CE. In the first place, Nicetes taught
Scopelian, whose pupil Herodes Atticus is a pivotal figure in the
Lives, as was duly stressed by Anderson. In the second place, Nicetes
may have been one of the first
sophists whose combination of sophistic achievements and high social
status
served to distinguish him to Philostratus as both recognizable as well
as
exemplary. The emergence of the
title ‘sophist’ in honorary and funeral inscriptions in the second half
of the
first century CE probably indicates, as was suggested by K. Goudriaan,
that
from this period the practice of sophistic declamation became a much
more
prestigious activity among members of the Greek elite than it had been
before. The discussion by E.L. Bowie of the
connection (or
the lack of connection) between the professional merits of sophists and
their
political careers forms the starting point for an analysis of the
statements in
the Lives of the Sophists on the
extent to which status depends on political participation, and on the
relationship between sophistic and other forms of oratory. The
impression the Lives give us is that, in the author’s
view, a lack of involvement in local politics does not detract from a
sophist’s
reputation. Public and private benefactions, on the other hand, were
essential
requirements according to Philostratus’ standards. His attitude towards
charging pupils illustrates this view. Although he defends the practice
of demanding
pay for rhetorical instruction as a method of helping pupils show they
have the
right priorities, he felt that teachers should take account of their
pupils’
financial means. The same standards apply to the practice of demanding
pay for
forensic oratory. This branch of oratory is distinctly distinguished
from
sophistic oratory: as a cultural phenomenon sophistic declamation has
an
autonomous significance, independent of the use of oratory in political
or judicial
contexts. These findings are corroborated by an analysis of the
anecdotes in
the Lives on the contacts between
sophists and emperors. As long as a sophist is not declaiming, his
position
vis-à-vis an emperor does not differ from that of other subjects. The
repeated
warnings against provoking tyrants are notable: in Philostratus’
opinion,
philosophical frankness is not a sophist’s virtue. Roles and
expectations
change, however, as soon as a sophist starts declaiming: the
audience-room
becomes an auditorium, the ruler an admiring listener, showing his
respect for
the sophist as a representative of Greek culture. Philostratus expects
emperors
to translate their appreciation into tangible favours and honours. Of
these
honours and favours, appointments to the posts of advocatus fisci and
ab
epistulis graecis are, in Philostratus’ opinion, based on
imperial
recognition of oratorical and literary merit. He does, however, clearly
distinguish
the qualities needed for these posts from the talent for declaiming
which is
the main qualification of a sophist. As far as appointments of sophists
to
other equestrian and to senatorial posts are concerned, Philostratus
does not
suggest any connection between these appointments and the sophistic
status of
the appointees. Occasionally, he even draws attention to disparaging
comments
of his heroes on the value of holding equestrian and senatorial posts
as
compared to sophistic achievements. Imperial rewards of these
achievements,
e.g. material gifts, purely ceremonial honours and appointments to
oratorical chairs,
on the other hand, are looked upon as essential to a sophist’s
prestige. The
bestowal of such rewards, however, is in his opinion not a
manifestation of
imperial recognition of the possible usefulness of a sophist’s
abilities but of
artistic merit.
Although
in
Philostratus’ view sophistic oratory as an art form has an autonomous
position
vis-à-vis political power, in reality the borderline between political
power
and literary culture was vague. Firstly, the struggle for prestige
connected
with artistic achievements could interfere with political conflicts.
Nevertheless, the standard in such cases seems to have been that
imperial
rewards were an acknowledgment of artistic merit. Secondly, border
traffic
between sophistic and deliberative oratory could result in politically
undesirable utterances, given that the glorification of Hellenic
greatness in
the past was characteristic of sophistic declamation. Plutarch’s
recommended
caution in using historical examples is adopted by Dio Chrysostom and
Aelius
Aristides in their political orations as well as by Philostratus
himself when
drawing lessons from the past. This points to the existence of at least
some
tension between the constant evocation of past Hellenic greatness and
the
acceptance of contemporary reality. It would be a mistake, however, to
interpret the classical themes of sophistic oratory as a manifestation
of
dissatisfaction with Roman rule. The attempt by Bowie to
connect the
archaizing tendencies in Greek imperial culture to the political
insignificance
of Greek urban aristocracies is only tenable in so far as it leaves
room for
the recognition of the fact that it was the constant evocation of the
glories
of the past more than anything else which allowed members of these
aristocracies
to accept and cooperate with Roman rule, and still preserve their
identity and
self-respect. Philostratus’ usage of the ethnic label Hellēnes for the
great sophists and their pupils illustrates the
importance of sophistic oratory as a method of expressing Greek
identity.
Literary culture and especially sophistic oratory gave members of Greek
aristocracies an opportunity to attain prestige of equal value to the
prestige
attached to a political career, in a field which was more or less
autonomous
vis-à-vis political reality.
The first and second sections of the second
chapter give a short introduction
to
the subject-matter covered and a
survey of the contents of the Life
of Apollonius. [Jona Lendering has put online this section in the translation by Peter Mason]. The
third section, Philostratus’
Apollonius, deals with the backgrounds to
the
apologetic portrayal of the Tyanean sage in the Life. The rejection
of
the opinion that Apollonius was a magician,
and the suggestion that the Tyanean sage had some extraordinary
connection with
divinity c.q. a divine nature, fall in line with the common defence
against
accusations of magic that miracle workers were ‘divine men’. Although
Apollonius’ divinity is strongly suggested in the Life, the author
avoids unequivocal statements on this issue. Probably
the same ambiguity was characteristic of pre-Philostratean traditions
on the
Tyanean sage, just as it was of traditions on the superhuman status of
Pythagoras. The Pythagorean doctrine of a third ontological category,
between human
and divine, was a useful as a device for legitimizing the activities of
charismatic sages and miracle workers in the first centuries CE.
Philostratus
himself, however, shows little affinity with these apologetics. The Lives of the Sophists
(523 and 590) as
well as the personal views expressed in the Life
of Apollonius (VII 39) display a combination of his
contempt and aversion
for everything reeking of magic. He even goes as far as to avow a total
disbelief in the effectiveness of magical practices. This attitude fits
in poorly
with the standard apologetics of miracle workers as ‘divine men’ and
lends
credibility to the notion that the Tyanean sage fascinated him as an
object of
literary treatment rather than as a figure-head for Pythagorean
propaganda.
The
fourth section of the second chapter, The sources, reviews
the scholarly
controversy on the reliability of Philostratus’ claims concerning the
sources
he used, as well as stating my own position on some of the issues
involved. Local
traditions, the writings of Maximus of Aegae and Moeragenes, letters
and other
writings ascribed to Apollonius, and the notorious memoirs of Damis are
dealt
with successively. There is no disagreement on the plausibility of
Philostratus
using local traditions about Apollonius. Neither is the existence of
Maximus’
work on Apollonius’ stay in Aegae doubted in recent publications.
Opinions
differ, however, on the character of Moeragenes’ work, which is
disqualified as
a source by Philostratus and mentioned by Origen (Cels.
VI 41). While Bowie and D.H. Raynor explain Philostratus’ dislike
of Moeragenes from the latter’s view of Apollonius as someone who
combined the
roles of magos and philosopher, and
deny Moeragenes’ alleged hostility towards the Pythagorean, Anderson adheres to the widely held
opinion that Philostratus’ predecessor was a hostile source. However, Anderson’s reading of Cels.
VI 41 will not do. According to Origen, Moeragenes did not
claim that philosophers eventually rejected Apollonius, as Anderson contends, but that they ended
up
acknowledging the reality of his magical powers. Moreover, the view of
Apollonius
as a philosopher and a magos corresponds to the
self-consciousness of the writer of Epp. Apoll. 16 and 17. Bowie and Raynor’s
interpretation would, therefore, seem preferable.
Epp.
Apoll. 16 and 17 belong to those independently transmitted
letters ascribed
to Apollonius which are not quoted by Philostratus. Based on the
assumption
that this category of the letters is, by and large, representative of a
pre-Philostratean tradition (unlike the independently transmitted
letters fully
quoted by Philostratus, which were, as has been pointed out by R.J.
Penella, extracted from the Life),
Philostratus’ portrayal of the Tyanean as a Pythagorean philosopher,
seen by
his contemporaries as a superhuman being, is compared with the image
emerging
from these letters. Clearly, the epistolographer considers himself a
Pythagorean philosopher, and alludes to human as well as divine
recognition of
his divine nature. The qualified acceptance of the title magos
by the author of Epp.
Apoll. 16 and 17, on the other hand,
differs from the attitude of Philostratus’ hero. It corresponds,
however, not
only to the most plausible view of the character of Moeragenes’ work,
but also
to the positive interpretation of the title magos
in magical papyri, and to the classification of magic with philosophy
as divine
gifts in the Corpus Hermeticum.
Apparently,
simple rejection of the title magos
in combination with a claim to superhuman status was not the only way
of
reacting to an accusation of magic.
The
representation in the Life of
Apollonius’ contacts with Euphrates’ of Tyrus and Dio of Prusa may
differ somewhat from pre-Philostratean
tradition on the Tyanean. Independently transmitted letters which are
not
quoted but only referred to in the Life
indicate, however, that such contacts were part of this tradition.
Probably the
same is true of contacts with Musonius Rufus and Scopelian. The
presence of
contacts with the Cynic philosopher Demetrius in pre-Philostratean
tradition on
Apollonius, on the other hand, can not be established by independently
transmitted letters which are not quoted in the Life.
Of
the other writings ascribed to Apollonius, and possibly used as a
source by Philostratus,
the ‘Life of Pythagoras’ mentioned in the Suda
is the most problematic case. The inference that Philostratus
embellished his
portrait of Apollonius with elements taken from the latter’s ‘Life of
Pythagoras’, based on similarities between the Life
of Apollonius and Iamblichus’ On
the Pythagorean Life (e.g. VA VIII 5 and 6 and VP 217), though
common
procedure, is bad method. It neglects the more plausible possibility
that the
Tyanean sage had already in pre-Philostratean tradition acquired some
features
of his illustrious predecessor. The controversy on the
credibility of Philostratus’ contention that he had the memoirs of a disciple
of Apollonius, Damis, at his disposal is the pièce de résistance of scholarly debate on the sources of the Life. Although the case against
Philostratus having used authentic memoirs of a companion of the Tyanean seems
strong, the possibility that he drew on a pseudepigraphic source is less easy
to rule out. The existence of this source, however, can not be established by
external evidence, pace Anderson. Neither can Anderson’s distinction between references to
‘Damis’ and to material introduced by such expressions as ‘they say’ stand the
test of criticism: Philostratus equates both sources by introducing material
previously ascribed to ‘Damis’ with the formula ‘they say’ (VA II 17 and III 6). References to Damis
are concentrated in the travel stories and in the episode of the confrontation
between Apollonius and Domitian. The material introduced by these references
reasonably corresponds to Philostratus’ description of the contents of Apollonius’
disciple’s memoirs (VA I 3). Even if
the author of the Life drew on Damis,
however, he combined the material taken from this source with data from other
sources and with information from other traditions on Apollonius. Moreover, he
probably allowed himself a wide licence to blow up meagre information into
complete episodes. Nevertheless, the arguments adduced by J. Miller, Ed.
Meyer, and Bowie are hardly decisive against Philostratus having used a
text passed of as the memoirs of a companion to Apollonius. Implausibility of
information is, as was argued by J. Mesk, not an argument against the
existence of a pseudepigraphic source, and elaboration should not be mistaken
for outright fiction. Bowie’s suggestion that the introduction of Damis’
memoirs is a ‘novelistic topos’ does not prove his case, and Meyer’s contention
that Philostratus’ invented ‘Damis’ to substantiate his own view of Apollonius
founders on the fact that the author refers to ‘Damis’ for information he feels
uncomfortable about. Meyer’s argument can be inverted: if the author’s attitude
towards magic can be characterized as a combination of contempt and aversion, it
is hardly conceivable that he would have ascribed to an invented source
information which causes such uneasiness as to compel him to dissociate himself
from his own invention (VA III 41; VII 39). Assuming that Philostratus drew on a pseudepigraphic source, can we
reconstruct something of its view of Apollonius? An attractive suggestion was
made by Reitzenstein: the hypothetical ‘Damis’ emphasized the superiority of
Pythagorean wisdom vis-à-vis Cynicism. This tendency is found in the travel
stories as well as in the Domitian episode, and its is from ‘Damis’ that
Demetrius may have found his way into the Life
of Apollonius. The antithesis of Pythagoreanism and Cynicism fits into the
probable rivalry between representatives of both schools in the second century
CE, while the denial of the magical character of Apollonius’ miracles may also
have been present in ‘Damis’ (VA VII 38). The conclusion is that Philostratus’ claim should be taken seriously: he
may very well have had a pseudepigraphic text of Pythagorean character at his
disposal, which had been passed off as the memoirs of a disciple of Apollonius’
and combined apologetics with legends on the Tyanean sage. While this
conclusion does not alter the appropriateness of the characterization of the Life as a vie romancée, it does draw our attention to the
possibility that the information in the Life
on the hero’s contacts with cities, and especially monarchs, had some basis in
pre-Philostratean tradition on the Tyanean sage.
The first section of the
third chapter is a short introduction
of the subject-matter covered. The second section, Greek Identity, gives a survey and analysis of the passages of the Life concerning this topic. Although
pure Greek descent is valued by Philostratus, Greek identity in the Life is not defined by racial purity,
but by acquirable qualities such as wisdom, paideia,
and the love of freedom. A similar non-racial interpretation of Greek identity can
be found in letters ascribed to Apollonius that are not fully quoted in the Life, especially Epp. Apoll. 71. While
this view makes it possible for foreigners to acquire a Greek identity, it can
be used at the same time to reject claims to this identity on the part of
persons who fall short of certain moral and/or cultural standards, despite
Greek extraction. This second possibility is actualized in the exhortations of
Philostratus’ hero towards Greek cities as well as in letters ascribed to
Apollonius. Although some of the admonitions made by Philostratus’ hero may
have been borrowed by the author from other philosophers, the possibility that
such admonitions, e.g. criticism of gladiatorial games held in the Dionysus
theatre in Athens, were ascribed to Apollonius in pre-Philostratean tradition cannot be
ruled out. Obvious these were philosopher’s topoi,
which circulated under the name of several philosophers. In such cases,
Philostratus may have restricted himself to amplification and literary
embellishment. Nevertheless, there is a subtle, but
significant difference between the Apollonius of the Letters and Philostratus’ hero: the ultimate consequence of falling
short of certain standards, i.e. loss of Greek identity, is less pronounced in
the Life than it is in the Letters. This is at least partly due to
the fact that Philostratus’ own view of Greek identity was different from the
one found in the letters ascribed to Apollonius. While for Philostratus paideia, familiarity with the Greek
literary tradition, seems to have been the main criterion for Greek identity,
the epistolographer emphasizes moral standards and a Greek way of life.
Philostratus’ way of dealing with the epistolographer’s exhortations for
preservation of Greek identity betrays the limitations of his own view. His
interpretation of the attack in Epp. Apoll. 71 on Ionian Greeks adopting
Roman names as criticism of an offence against linguistic purity is
characteristic: the paraphrase in the Life
is a striking misrepresentation of the letter’s intent, which is that adopting
a Roman name is tantamount to giving up Greek identity. The author’s concerns
can also be seen in an anecdote (obviously his own invention) about a young
Arcadian whose father has sent him to Rome to study law instead of giving him
a decent Greek education (VII 42). The
carefree identification in the Life
of wisdom and love of freedom with Greek identity also betrays the author’s attitude.
The same is true of the numerous allusions to the Classical past. The
proclamation of attachment to personal and political freedom as a typically
Greek virtue can hardly be reconciled with the philosophical concept of freedom
as expressed in Epp. Apoll. 28.
The third section of the
third chapter, The Omnipresence of Greek
civilization, deals with the Hellenizing image of India as well as with foreign criticism of Greek idiosyncrasies in the Life. The Hellenizing image of India operates as a means to neutralize the tension between two tendencies in
the Life: idealization of Indian
wisdom and Greek self-respect. ‘Damis’ is frequently referred to in connection
with this Hellenizing image, which presumably had a similar function in
Philostratus’ pseudepigraphic source as it has in the Life. Otherwise, some details in the description of India in the Life speak for
autopsy, as was observed by the excavator of Taxila, J. Marshall. Behind ‘Damis’, there may
be eyewitness reports on India in the first century CE. Indian and Ethiopian criticisms of Greek
peculiarities, on the other hand, without exception fit in with Philostratus’
own sphere of interest.
The fourth section of the third chapter, Problems in Civic Life, discusses the
interventions of Philostratus’ hero in conflicts in cities in the eastern half
of the Roman empire and his advice to their citizens how to live together. The author
offers a stasis typology by making a
distinction between disorder resulting from public entertainment on the one
hand, and disturbances caused by famine on the other (VA I 15). Conflicts between members of the cities’ elite are
implicitly stated to be another source of trouble (VA IV 8), and a lack of enthusiasm for shouldering the burdens of
civic life is also hinted at (VA IV
32). Philostratus’ picture of his hero’s interventions and advice fits in with
what we know about the problems facing the Greek world of the first centuries
CE. A striking case in point is the pattern in riots, as described in the Life (I 15f.), which fully corresponds
to the priorities expressed by the inhabitants of a village in the Hermus
valley (TAM V 611): bread and baths. We
must leave room for the possibility that the diatribes of Philostratus’
Apollonius against public entertainment and unwarranted civic pride in outward
appearances were ascribed to Apollonius in pre-Philostratean tradition, despite
the similarities with utterances ascribed to other early imperial philosophers.
Again, such exhortations may have circulated under the name of several philosophers.
Although some scenes may have been invented by Philostratus, the picture of
Apollonius as fighting stasis and
bringing about homonoia is not a
product of Philostratus’ imagination, as is demonstrated by the letters to the
Sardians. There is no indication that, in portraying Apollonius as a civic
conciliator, he stressed specifically contemporary problems in city life: the
problems as described in the Life are
characteristic of the early imperial period in general. One can, however,
detect in these descriptions, the author’s awareness of the existence of such
problems as well as well as his awareness of the importance of the proper functioning
of local government to Roman rule.
The fifth section of the
third chapter, Greek Self-awareness and
Roman rule, discusses the relationship between these two elements in the Life. While criticism of the exercise of
Roman rule by governors is frequent, Roman rule in itself is spoken of with
appreciation as a stronghold of peace, law and order. No doubt these favourable
comments reflect the author’s opinion. At the same time, it must be said that
his appreciation of Roman rule is rather limited and does not result in complete
identification with Rome.
Admittedly, Philostratus has his characters refer to the inhabitants of the
Empire as ‘us’, but only when they are confronted with hostile barbarians or
rebellious Jews; Romans as such are invariably ‘the others’. The combination of
acceptance and appreciation of Roman rule with occasional criticism of
governors is characteristic of Greek authors of the early imperial period, e.g.
Plutarch and Dio of Prusa, and there is no reason why we should expect a
different attitude from the author of the Life.
Appreciation of Roman rule can also be found in the letters ascribed to
Apollonius. The epistolographer should, in spite of his criticisms of Roman
officials, not be considered an ‘enemy of the Roman order’. In this respect,
Philostratus’ representation of his hero’s attitude corresponds to the
epistolographic tradition to which, however, he does not refer in this context.
In some cases he may have used local traditions, e.g. for the incident
described in VA VI 38, where the
governor of Syria is held responsible for an outbreak of stasis in Antiochia.
Philostratus has Apollonius advise Vespasian to
send speakers of Greek as proconsuls to Greek provinces, and speakers
of Latin
to provinces with Latin-speaking populations (VA V 36). Although the term ‘speakers of Greek’ (hellēnizontes) in itself does not
exclude most senators from the western half of the empire, the contrast with ‘speakers
of Latin’ indicates that we should interpret the hellēnizontes as native speakers. This piece of advice, for which
Philostratus himself is undoubtedly responsible, may very well reflect some
discontent among members of the Greek aristocracies with proconsular
appointments under the Severan emperors. As has been pointed out by P.M.M.
Leunissen, appointments in the years 180-235 show, as compared to the
preceding period, a diminished tendency to take into account the geographic
extraction of the appointees. The
author of the Life combines a very
negative presentation of Nero with a positive assessment of the emperor’s ‘liberation
of Hellas’. Probably, the letters condemning
Vespasian’s annulment of Greek freedom (VA
V 41 = Epp. Apoll. 42f-h) are Philostratean inventions, as is indicated by their
characteristically sophistic evocation of the Classical past, i.e. the Persian
wars, and by their non-philosophical conception of freedom. Philostratus shares
his enthusiasm for Nero’s gift with Plutarch and Pausanias. These authors, who
fully accepted Roman rule, interpreted the ‘liberation of Hellas’ as a recognition of the special
position of the Greeks among Rome’s subjects.
The first section of the fourth chapter gives a
short introduction to the
subject-matter covered. The second section, Roman emperors, systematically compares the characterization of
first-century emperors and the information on their reigns in the Life with historiographical and
biographical writings on the emperors in question. In addition, the chapter
examines the extent to which Philostratus claims to derive his information on
Apollonius’ contacts with these emperors from sources on the Tyanean sage. Nero’s
portrayal in the Life as well as in
the Nero (probably by the same
author) is dominated by three elements: the emperor’s attempt to dig a canal
through the Corinthian Isthmus, his performance as an artist, and the murder of
Agrippina. The image of the emperor as a citharoedus and a matricide closely
fits in with the negative portrayal in the historiographical and biographical
literature and with the judgment given by such authors as Plutarch and Dio of
Prusa. The attempt to cut the Isthmus, on the other hand, seems to have struck
the right cord with Philostratus, who also shows approval for Nero in the Lives of the Sophists (VS 512). Probably,
the sophist was not totally indifferent to the emperor’s philhellenism. Philostratus’
account of Apollonius’ vicissitudes during Nero’s reign lacks chronological
coherence. The most natural explanation for this lack of coherence is that the
author used information from various sources. References to traditions on
Apollonius in this context are restricted to the correspondence with Musonius (VA IV 46) and to ‘Damis’ in connection
with a conversation about Nero’s Greek tour (VA V 7). The scarcity of such references gives rise to the
suspicion that it was a lack of evidence on Apollonius’ adventures during
Nero’s reign which compelled Philostratus to use information from other
sources, e.g. legends on Musonius and Demetrius. Undoubtedly, he also drew on
historiographical and biographical literature about Nero. The same is true of
the account of Apollonius’ vicissitudes during Nero’s fall and the following
months. He refers to ‘Damis’, however, for his hero’s alleged involvement in
the preparations of Vindex’ revolt (VA
V 10) and for his predictions on the fate of Galba, Otho and Vitellius (VA V 11-13).
In spite of a minor
chronological problem and a few slips, the narrative of Apollonius’
alleged
meeting with Vespasian and two fellow philosophers in Alexandria in
December 69 has an authentic flavour, due to numerous
correspondences to the historiographical and biographical literature on
the
establishment of the Flavian dynasty. Again, however, references to
sources on
Apollonius are scarce. The only ‘evidence’ for the meeting with
Euphrates and
Dio is Philostratus’ reference to letters ascribed to Apollonius, none
of which
mention any such meeting (VA V 38f.),
and there is a complete lack of any references in connection with the meeting
with the emperor. Probably the whole episode was made up on the basis of
letters attesting the Tyanean’s contacts with Euphrates and
Dio and, possibly, a mention by ‘Damis’ of a visit to Alexandria (VA V 26). Lavish utilization
of historiography and imperial biography must be taken for granted.
The meeting between Philostratus’
hero and Titus at Tarsus after
the fall of Jerusalem is dominated by a central theme of Flavian
propaganda, which also
influenced historiographical and biographical literature on the
establishment
of the dynasty, i.e. the harmonious relationship between Vespasian and
Titus.
Again, utilization of imperial biography and historiography by
Philostratus seems
plausible. The author refers to ‘Damis’ to support the interpretation
of a
prediction by Apollonius of the way the emperor’s son will die (VA VI 32). He also quotes several
letters, which may be his own inventions, however. Possibly, the whole episode,
including the indirect participation of the Cynic Demetrius, was made up on the
basis of a mention in ‘Damis’ of Apollonius’ prophecy. The dramatic climax of the Life is the protagonist’s confrontation with Domitian. The
emperor’s portrayal and the description of events during his reign in the Life have much in common with the
biographical and historiographical literature on the last Flavian ruler and
with the writings of Pliny and Tacitus. The account of Apollonius’ attempt to
instigate a senatorial conspiracy against the tyrant, on the other hand, is
hard to reconcile with what we know about the political position and
vicissitudes of his alleged fellow conspirator Nerva during Domitian’s last
years. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that in pre-Philostratean
traditions on Apollonius the Tyanean was indeed associated with Domitian.
Apollonius' vision, in Ephesus in the year 96, of the emperor’s
death (VA VIII 26) is also mentioned
by Cassius Dio; probably the historiographer independently used the same local
tradition as the author of the Life. Moreover,
Apollonius refers to a letter falsely ascribed to Apollonius which gave an unflattering
impression of the philosopher’s conduct vis-à-vis the tyrant (VA VII 35). In addition to these
indications which imply a connection between the emperor and Apollonius in
pre-Philostratean tradition, the collection of letters ascribed to Apollonius
contains two letters to Domitian which can hardly be reconciled with
Philostratus’ presentation of the relationship between both men (Epp. Apoll.
20f.). ‘Damis’ is referred to by the author of the Life in connection with his account of Apollonius’ captivity and
trial. The possible reliability of these references does not alter the probability
that Philostratus used historiography and imperial biography when elaborating
material taken from ‘Damis’.
Conclusions on the
credibility of Philostratus’ claims concerning the sources available to
him on
the Tyanean, should not be based on the extent to which information in
the Life resembles data from historiography
and imperial biography. After all, most scholars agree on the plausibility of
Philostratus having used such sources for his account of Apollonius’ contacts
with emperors. The question is whether, in using historiography and imperial
biography, he invented contacts between the Tyanean and emperors which were
not somehow hinted at in the sources available to him on Apollonius, or whether
he amplified material taking from existing traditions on his hero (possibly
very meagre) into complete episodes. It is at this point that the problems
concerning ‘Damis’ reappear. Explicit references to ‘Damis’ in episodes
concerning Apollonius’ contacts with and comments on emperors are rare: they
only relate to a conversation on Nero’s Greek tour, a prophecy of the short
duration of the reigns of Galba, Otho and Vitellius, the interpretation of a
prediction of Titus’ death, Apollonius’ captivity and trial during the reign of
Domitian, and the delivery of a letter to Nerva. While this leaves plenty of
room for Philostratean invention, one can hardly maintain that a text passed
off as the memoirs of a disciple of Apollonius cannot have attributed to him
utterances on Nero, predictions of imperial successions, and a martyrdom under
Domitian. On the other hand, neither does the factual information in the Life ascribed to ‘Damis’ provide any
positive evidence to support the existence of such a pseudepigraphic text.
Confronted with this deadlock, we turn to the conceptions of the relationship
between philosopher and ruler behind Philostratus’ romanticized biography.
The third section of the fourth chapter, Philosopher and Monarch: Two Complementary
Roles, disentangles these conceptions and places them in an
ideological-historical setting. The account of Apollonius’ contacts with
monarchs in the Life is dominated by
the conceptions of the philosopher as a fearless opponent of tyrants and as a
councillor to good rulers. Tyrants are enemies of philosophy, while good
monarchs show themselves willing to listen to the advice of philosophers, an
attitude which even turns into religious worship of the sage. Claims by rulers
to superhuman status and demands to be treated accordingly by their subjects,
on the other hand, are consistently rejected. The
portrayal of Apollonius as a fearless opponent of tyrants can be shown to correspond
to an ideal which goes back to the Classical period. There are no indications
other than references to ‘Damis’ to support Apollonius’ hostility towards Nero.
There are indications, however, which confirm the existence before Philostratus
of traditions about Apollonius’ contacts with Domitian. These were modelled
probably as early as the pre-Philostratean tradition on the conception of the
philosopher as an opponent of tyranny, which had also influenced legends about
Pythagoras. It seems plausible that a source like ‘Damis’ projected elements
from the Pythagoras legend, i.e. from the stories of the confrontation between
the Crotonian sage and Phalaris, on the Tyanean. The
portrayal of Apollonius as an advisor to good rulers corresponds to a
conception with an equally long history. The hierarchic character of the
relationship between philosopher and ruler is especially prominent in the
Indian episode of the Life. This fits
in with a tradition of idealizing Indian sages which goes back to the early
Hellenistic period. Nevertheless, the conception of the sage as an object of
religious worship by the king is absent in Greek literature on India until the early third century CE.
Then it emerges almost simultaneously in Bardesanes (FGrHist 719F2) and the Life
of Apollonius (VA III 10 and,
with a reference to ‘Damis’, III 27). Later in the same century it can be found
in a relic of Porphyry’s Homeric
Questions (ad Il. I 340).
Moreover, in Neoplatonic literature philosophers are frequently represented as
receiving religious worship from their adherents, including rulers. The
presence of such a conception in the Life
requires an explanation: it is absent in the works of the historians of
Alexander and in Megasthenes, whose descriptions of India served as a model for Greek authors
in the Imperial period. The provenance of the conception from ‘Damis’ offers
such an explanation: it may very well have gained currency among
Neopythagoreans in the second century CE. The relic of Porphyry’s Homeric Questions should be understood
as a reflection of an attempt to lump together elements from different sources
and contexts by subsuming them under the ancient Pythagorean doctrine of a
third ontological category, between human and divine. The elements include the
concept of the superhuman nature of the king found in such Neopythagorean
writings as pseudo-Ecphantus’ On Kingship,
and the conception of the sage as an object of religious worship by the king,
probably derived from traditions on such charismatic sages and miracle workers
as Apollonius. When
Philostratus refers to ‘Damis’ in accounts of Apollonius’ contacts with and
statements about monarchs, the Tyanean’s role as a soothsayer is a recurrent
element (VA V 11 and VI 32). It is an
attractive guess that ‘Damis’ combined the conception of the sage as an object
of religious worship by rulers with the role of the sage as a soothsayer and a
kingmaker. If Philostratus derived these related concepts from ‘Damis’,
however, he also introduced them in episodes for which ‘Damis’ probably offered
no support, e.g. the meeting with Vespasian in Alexandria. Moreover, Philostratus does not refer to ‘Damis’ for Apollonius’ role
as an advisor to monarchs, and although some independently transmitted letters
not quoted in the Life present the
epistolographer as an advisor to emperors (especially Epp. Apoll. 20), the
author does not even mention these letters. The conclusion is that, although
Philostratus may very well have found indications of Apollonius’ role as an
opponent of tyranny and a predictor of imperial successions in ‘Damis’, the
portrayal of the Tyanean as a councillor to kings and emperors should probably
be considered a Philostratean invention. This certainly applies to the
elaboration of Apollonius’ symbouleutic role in dialogues and speeches.
The fourth section of the fourth chapter, Apollonius’ Recommendations, deals with
this elaboration. The debate on the best constitution between Euphrates, Dio of Prusa and Apollonius before
Vespasian is a striking illustration of the tendency among authors educated in
the intellectual climate of the Second Sophistic to imitate historiographical
forms from the Classical period when their subject-matter allowed such a
procedure. The opinion expressed by Euphrates is an important element of Philostratus’
characterization of the historical background of the Alexandrian episode: the
position of the Stoic philosopher shows remarkable similarities to the conduct
of Helvidius Priscus, as interpreted in the early third century. Dio’s position
and some of the arguments adduced by Apollonius probably show influence from
deliberative declamations on the theme of the abdication of a tyrant. The most
interesting argument of Philostratus’ Apollonius, the equalization of monarchy
to ‘democracy’, was, at least since the Antonine period, part of the legitimization
of imperial rule. Philostratus’
Apollonius repeatedly questions the advisability of philosophical conduct for
monarchs as well as the relevance of a philosopher’s advice to rulers. While
the debate on the desirability and possibility of combining power and wisdom
has a long history in Greek political thought, these reservations about the usefulness
of philosophy to a ruler may well reflect the opinion of the author, who shows
little affinity with idealized conceptions of the relationship between
philosopher and ruler in the Lives of the
Sophists. The
debate on the best constitution is followed by a symbouleutic speech of Apollonius
on the exercise of supreme power. This speech consists primarily of
commonplaces from the tradition of Greek political thought, although some of
the advice probably reflects demands concerning imperial conduct formulated in
the first century CE. The only advice directly relevant to the early third-century
situation is the exhortation to appoint hellēnizontes
as governors of Greek provinces, a theme dealt with in the fifth section of the
third chapter. The fifth section of the fourth chapter, The Topicality of Apollonius’
Recommendations, discusses several attempts to interpret the Life as reflective of the author’s
political views, or even as possessing a marked political tendency, and points
out some of the problems involved. The interpretation of the characterizations
of first-century emperors in the Life
as alluding to Severan emperors often results in neglect of the lavish
utilization by Philostratus of historiography and imperial biography on the
first century. Moreover, the supposition that Philostratus’ Apollonius is a
mouthpiece of the author of the Life seems
very problematic: the ‘political’ activities of the hero of the Life are modelled on conceptions of the
philosopher’s role, and there is no need to assume that Philostratus entirely
shared these conceptions. On the contrary, the warnings against provoking
monarchs in the Lives of the Sophists
indicate that he did not, at any rate, share all of them. On the other hand,
there are some passages in the Life
which Philostratus’ contemporaries must have understood as allusions to recent
political events, e.g. the murder of Geta by Caracalla (VA I 28; VI 32) and the conduct of Elagabalus (III 28). The author’s
opinions and concerns can be heard especially in the allusions to possible
threats to Greek identity and Greek self-respect, such as the trend among young
Greeks to study Roman law (VA VII 42)
and Roman emperors’ consistent appointment of rhōmaïzontes as governors of Greek provinces. Such allusions do
not, however, warrant the conclusion that the Life has a marked political tendency. Rather, they betray the
author’s limited sphere of interest. I will not summarize my Conclusions as that would involve repeating much of what has been said so far. I would like, however, to recapitulate the
information which, in my opinion, indicates that Philostratus had indeed access
to a pseudepigraphic source of Pythagorean character, i.e. ‘Damis’. Firstly,
Philostratus refers to ‘Damis’ to support information which is hard to
reconcile with his own attitude towards magic, and which gives him reason to
state emphatically his own feelings. Secondly, the information ascribed to ‘Damis’
presupposes a conflict with Cynicism. This probably reflects the rivalry
between Pythagoreans and Cynics for the favours of the same audience in the
second century CE. Thirdly, a pseudepigraphic source of Pythagorean character may
very well have projected elements from the Pythagoras legend on Apollonius,
similar to those found in the account of the Tyanean’s confrontation with Domitian
in the Life. And last but not least,
the Indian episode of the Life shows
a conception of the relationship between sages and kings of which there is no
evidence in Greek literature on India before the third century CE. A
pseudepigraphic text of Pythagorean character, passed off as the memoirs of a
companion of Apollonius, is, at the very least, an extremely viable explanation
for the inclusion of such a conception in a work by an author such as
Philostratus. Scholars who maintain that ‘Damis’ is a Philostratean invention,
should, in my opinion, offer alternative explanations on these four points.
