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a comparison between Tolstoy and Plato by Drs. T. J. Kuijl ©1995-1999 last updated April 29, 1999 |
CHAPTER II
1.
The general psychological model of man
As had been shown in our previous general introduction of Plato it is very
well possible to make sense of the dialectical and formal procedure of
"synopsis and dieresis" in the Phaedrus dialogue to produce a logically
coherent 'doctrine of Eros'. This 'doctrine of Eros' not only proved the
relevance of its 'synoptic phase' (sunoyij)
with regard to Plato's Phaedrus dialogue, but also clarified some aspects
of the Symposium that seemed to be acknowledging this unique interpretation.
In short Eros had been defined in Symposium as a desire for something we
don not have at our actual possession, we do not have within our reach,
we do not have at our disposal. However we have some sort of notion of
this object of desire and we pursue to get it to give us some form of satisfaction.
This had been identified with 'desires in relative context'.
Further Plato had been found to define in the Phaedrus dialogue a synoptic
analysis of 'desire' specifying it as a 'genus concept' covering two opposite
'types' of desire (237d). One of these desires was closely related with
our rational capacities, while the other was closely related with our physical
and sensuous capacities. In Symposium we had been able to identify these
two types of desire in an 'absolute context' with the concepts of Abundance
-POROS- and Shortage -PENIA-,
while these concepts also had been shown to be relevant in a 'relative
context'. In short we could say that desire causes our action. 'that we
act'. While the specific conditions and objectives, viz. how and why we
act, is caused by our rationality or emotions (the absolute context), or
by abundance or out of lack (the relative context).
So far both literary products of Plato had proven to contain the same definition
that had in some way been concealed and cloaked by his literary and poetic
genius. The Phaedrus dialogue further had mentioned that these two types
of desire both strive (and therefore desire) for domination over each other
in order to control the conduct of the human soul. Both types of desire
trade places in the domination of the human soul, both with an opposite
effect. Proof of this can be found in Socrates first (237c-241d) and second
speech (244a-257a) of the Phaedrus dialogue.
All of this had been exemplified in the Phaedrus dialogue in the context
of pederast homosexual love relationships between men that were quite common
in classical Greece. We should remind ourselves that these love relationships
were essentially asymmetric, which signifies that there was no question
of love amongst equals like in modern times. Love relationships were considered
to be existing of an active partner and a passive partner (!), which meant
in these homosexual pederastic relationships between males that the elder
partner had to take the initiative and was expected to provide moral guidance
and help with the civic initiation of the young boy that was the 'object
of his desire'. The younger counterpart who was supposed to be passive
had to receive the advances of his admirer with reluctance. This did not
signify that the advances of his elder lover were not to welcomed to be
unanswered. Rather one could say that just as in our modern times with
regard to girls, the young males were considered to be 'decent' if they
acted passively to any advances and played 'hard to get'. Eventually if
the intentions of the elder male towards the young boy had proved to be
upright and serious the young boy could take up the active role (anti-eros)
by showing his love for the elder man and by granting him sexual favours
in return.
After both speeches of Lysias and Socrates and after the intervention of
Socrates' 'divine sign' in the Phaedrus dialogue (242b-c) the secondly
mentioned phase called "dieresis" (diaresij)
becomes relevant in explaining further Plato's dialectical definition of
Eros. As has been said before the aim of this phase is to start with a
genus -Eros in this case- as primal species and try to subdivide this in
subspecies. This subdivision continues until the reality is reached of
which the definition had been searched. Another relevant aspect of this
subdivision is that it is based on dichotomy. Every split produces a doubling
in two subspecies that are contrary to each other. For instance Plato's
exemplification in the Phaedrus dialogue of the dialectical and dieretic
dichotomy of Eros tells us how the two irrational but contrary parts of
the soul had been previously referred to under one common denominator as
"leading principle" (265e). As we might remember this "leading principle"
itself had been one of the two contrary types of desire that had been defined
by dichotomy. The Phaedrus dialogue literally tells us to start up the
second phase of reasoning with its dieretic classification, there were
the description of the malicious type of desire changes in a description
of desire which leads to a so-called "divine madness" (265c-d). Both allocations
leave little doubt that the dieretic phase takes of where the blessing
of the "divine madness" with regard to desire is to be proved (245c). In
this context the two types of "madness" that are mentioned in his dialectical
classification get their relevance (266a). There exists a leftist (negative,
mundane) madness explained in Socrates' first speech, and a rightist (positive,
divine) type of madness explained in his second speech, that are the product
of the domination in the human soul of the respectively physical and sensuous
desires and of the rational and reasonable desires. For all clarity the
next image illustrates this classification of these two opposite types
of "madness".
In his explanation and prove of this "divine madness" Plato uses one of
his most famous poetic metaphors of the nature of the human soul by comparing
it with the combined power of a winged charioteer in his cart pulled by
two winged horses. With this metaphoric image of the human soul both previously
mentioned aspect of his dialectic and dieretic classification are to be
exemplified. First of all it reveals how the conduct of the human soul
is caused by two different "leading principles" that desire and strive
for the internal domination of the human soul (237c). Obviously the charioteer
who steers the cart is to be identified with the rational and reasonable
capacities
and desires of the human soul. On the other hand both the winged horses
that pull the cart refer to the physical and sensuous desires of the human
soul. The other aspect of the dialectic and dieretic classification has
to do with the continuous division of desire until the ultimate specification
has been reached. As has been already been mentioned the combined pair
of horses that form one of the two "leading principles" can obviously itself
be reckoned to represent two specific types of physical and sensuous desire
(265e) that both appear to have some autonomy in their conduct.
The metaphor of the charioteer and the horses vividly paints the nature
of the hegemonic struggle between the two "leading principles" of the human
soul over the control of its conduct. The myth proceeds with the transcendent
rise of all souls to the "Field of Truth". All souls once went in a preemperic
existence to the top of the celestial sphere under the leadership of the
Gods and demons. All of them try to accompany the Gods on their tour around
the celestial sphere to view as much as possible with them this "Field
of Truth". The success of these souls in viewing the "Field of Truth" is
highly dependent on the status of the command structure of the soul. If
the charioteer succeeds in his desire to take charge of the horses and
can execute his natural leadership like he should, he has the possibility
to steer the cart on top of the celestial sphere to view the "Field of
Truth" (248a-c). However if the charioteer is unable to perform his task
properly and when the horses succeed in their desire to take over his control
over the direction of the cart against the natural order, the soul as a
whole will be unable to see any of this. It is said what difficulties it
takes for the charioteer to master these combined set of horses that very
definitely seem to be possessing a "mind of their own". Therefore the success
of his enterprise depends on the degree at which the rational and reasonable
faculties and desires are successful in their desire to take charge of
the horses that metaphorically represent his physical and sensuous faculties
and desires.
It is said that in this "Field of Truth" the "Beautiful" had been the brightest
form and that therefore this had been the easiest to be seen by the souls
who more or less had seen the top. Only these souls that succeeded in viewing
some of this " Field of Truth" and therefore have had been able to have
seen some of this "Beauty" could afterwards be incarnated in a human body
endowed with reason in our material world (249b-c; 250b- 252b). All human
beings therefore have seen at least something of the transcendent "Beauty"
in their preemperic existence, and they carry with them more or less a
remembrance and latent notion of the transcendent fullness of the Good,
the Beautiful and the Truth. This explains why humans are so apt and sensitive
for all that is beautiful around us in this world. When people in
this world see a beautiful object or person they can recognize some of
the transcendent Beauty, and this actualizes their remembrance of the 'preemperic
transcendent Beauty' inciting an intense desire within them for this and
driving them 'mad'. The distinctive form of madness, viz. a divine or a
mundane and merely instinctive, gets determined by the inner constitution
of the lover; if his rational and reasonable faculty is in control the
divine madness comes to live, if the irrational faculty controls his conduct
the mundane type of madness will occur.
In this respect the metaphor appears to have reached the conclusion that
it aimed for. Our desire for and contact with the physical beauty of a
beloved person does not necessarily lead us to all sort of ugly instinctive
obsessions and excesses like had been told of the leftist and mundane type
of 'madness' in Socrates' first speech. This only happens when our physical
and sensuous desires succeed against the natural order with their desire
to take charge over the soul to control its conduct. Then our encounters
with beautiful persons in the material world will only an incite an instinctive
desire for sexual gratification. If however our rational and reasonable
faculties are in control their desires for a beautiful beloved person makes
us recognize its divine quality, reminding and lifting us up to the transcendent
Beauty that it reflects. This recognition of the transcendent Beauty in
the beauty of a living human being incites the lover to fall deeply in
love with him and will urge him to restrain and discipline the instinctive
horse, resulting in what has been called a "divine madness".
The metaphoric representation of the human soul as a charioteer with a
combined set of horses entails a further dieretic specification of these
two leading principles. As has been referred to before the combined set
of horses as one leading principle represent in themselves two different
and opposite types of desire (253c-e). One of the horses is described as
being very ugly and extremely disobedient to the steering of the charioteer.
It represents the instinctive and sensuous desires of the human soul like
that for sexual satisfaction or greed for money. The other horse is quite
the contrary, it is good looking, noble and by nature obedient to the reins
of the charioteer. This horse is inclined to courageousness and other high-spirited
desires.
The mixed nature of this "leading principle" reveals itself first in the
preemperic rise of the souls to the "Field of Truth". The vile horse is
heavy, disobedient and causes great problems for the charioteer in getting
his cart up to the super celestial sphere. And when it would get his way
the cart would not reach any of the transcendent realities, but would get
stuck in the domain of "becoming and opinion" (247b-e). The other noble
horse on the contrary has no problem obeying to the reins of the charioteer
and is a great help in pulling the cart upwards. During the story of the
elder male lover and his beloved younger companion this duality is again
metaphorically portrayed by the behaviour of the horses (253c-256b). The
vile horse in the soul is constantly urging to pursuit for immediate gratification
of his sexual desires and can only be submitted to the wishes of the charioteer
after being forcefully disciplined. The noble horse on the contrary is
aware and shameful of the vile character of his colleague's carnal desires.
It therefore causes the charioteer no problems in executing his wishes
following the natural order, and its passionate and honourable feelings
of love even help the charioteer to uplift the conduct of his inferior
counterpart to a higher moral standard. All of this confirms the continuous
dieretic classification of the physical and sensuous desires of the human
soul. The horses resemble each other to the extent that both are irrational,
but they differ because of the contrary nature of their desires.
It is quite possible to split by dichotomy the charioteer with a similar
classification in two distinctive capacities. Though it is not common in
modern commentaries2 we can -following Plato's
dialectical indications- split this reasonable leading principle by distinguishing
between the charioteer and the reins he uses to manipulate the horses.
The charioteer has to be identified with the nous (nouj);
this has a receptive insight for the transcendental realities and is therefore
able to distinguish Truth, Wisdom and Justice. Following the natural order
it would be the first one in command of the soul. The reins of the charioteer
localize metaphorically the rational capacity called logistikon (logijtikon);
they represent the rational capacity for discursive reasoning by means
of which the nous articulates itself. In the Politeia the logistikon is
being termed as an instrument of the nous (IX 582d). In the Statesman Plato
makes a similar dichotic distinction in the process of rational reasoning.
The logistikon is endowed with the capacity for reasonable judgement, while
the other rational operation has to give a final command over the result
of this discursive calculative judgement (260a).
With regard to the conduct of the soul as a whole this specification of
the rational faculty of the soul would mean the following. If the charioteer
nous (nouj) would be in charge
of the soul, his insight in the transcendent realities would determine
with what kind of discursive reasoning by means of the logistikon (logijtikon)
he would desire to address and control his physical and sensuous desires.
The charioteer (nouj) has the capacity
and desire to focus on transcendent realities in the "Field of Truth" such
as Truth, Justice, etc. And with his inner eyes on these transcendent realities
he would desire to lead both horses (the physical and sensuous desires)
by means of his reasonable and discursive capacities that are metaphorically
localized in the reins (logistikon)3.
The result of this final dieretic classification can be observed in the
next illustration4.
All of this doesn't mean at all that the physical and sensuous desires
(the horses) have to be given up or sacrificed with regard to the pursuit
of the truth. On the contrary, the Politeia confidently declares that "in
both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires
that wait upon knowledge and reason and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction
with them, take only these pleasures which reason approves, will since
they follow truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is possible
with them" (IX 586d). In the Laws Plato states emphatically that the high-spirited
desires are indispensable for our pursuit for Justice. And
also the love-story in the Phaedrus dialogue nowhere claims that the lovers
have to distance themselves from their passionate feelings and "divine
madness" for their loved one, on the contrary. The friendship amongst a
couple with no passionate feelings at all is considered to be a inferior
type of mortal parsimoniousness with a narrowness "which the common
folk will praise as virtue" (256e-257a).
In this respect the love relationships that Plato describes in the Phaedrus
dialogue are not that 'platonic' as a lot of scholars would like to admit.
The lovers touch, caress and lye with each other and their togetherness
fills the air with sensuous electricity. We modern lovers would perhaps
say, 'love is in the air'. Though Plato rejects the actual deed of homosexual
intercourse like that between man and between woman calling it unnatural.
Therefore he tells that the pederastic love affair that combines true love
and faithfulness with the pursuit of wisdom and sexual abstention is esteemed
to be the best. Their rating in the "Olympic games" of lovers gives them
an incontestable first place (256a-b). However he judges the philosophical
lovers who -with moderation- make love with each other in the sense of
actual sexual intercourse quite mildly. As long as their homosexual desires
do not form the main prerogative for their togetherness and they will honour
their love with a life long faithfulness, Plato certainly does not express
any great concern in the Phaedrus dialogue (256c-e).
What matters is that when the physical and sensuous desires -as one of
the leading principles- succeed in their desire to take over control in
the human soul their desires will totally determine its conduct. Eventually
even the high-spirited desires will be corrupted in such a manner that
they transform into covetousness of honour by envy, love of victory by
violence, ill temper by indulgence in anger (Politeia 586d). As a result
these irrational desires that are by nature insatiable and do not know
how to keep bounds because they have no innate sense for rational order
(logoj), will get 'hooked' by a
blind pursuit for pleasure in our finite mundane reality. In other words
these irrational desires that have their proper role as the necessary5
vital and dynamic powers in the material reality, will get 'stuck' in this
material reality and will so lose their tractive powers for the transcendent
rise of the soul as a whole.
This dieretic analyses of the hegemonistic struggle of both "leading principles"
reveals the 'tricky' nature of Eros. When the charioteer is in command
over the combined set of horses they will be instrumental to his desires
in getting him where he wants to be, leading him to transcendent realities
like Truth, Wisdom and Justice. But if the horses succeed in their desire
to take the command of the charioteer, he can become instrumental in serving
them with his insight and discursive reasoning, leading them more efficiently
and successfully to finite mundane pleasures like egocentric pride and
prestige, material wealth and sexual satisfaction. Human beings with great
rational potential are in this manner even more capable to acquire bigger
irrational pleasures. You could say that the greater their rational potential
is, the greater the perversions are their rational faculties produce, when
they are inspired by and serving for the benefit of their irrational desires
(Politeia 518e-519b). Perversio optimi pessima.
The Phaedrus dialogue shows this aspect for example in the speech made
by Lysias and spoken out by Phaedrus at the start of the dialogue (230e-234c).
Of course this speech has to be situated in the asymmetric homosexual context
where the elder male has to prove that his advances towards the younger
lad -Phaedrus in this case- are worthwhile to be answered by his 'anti-eros'.
In an acquit type of reasoning Lysias' speech paints the benefits on can
get if one renders sexual favours6 to somebody
-and Lysias in particular- who is not desirous towards him. This type of
calculating sexual relationships would, Lysias reasons, in short be the
best rational choice producing an honourable, respectful and caring friendship
that would last even if the relationship were finished.
In a direct response to this speech Socrates in his typical ironic manner
praises the beauty of the rhetorical form but leaves no doubt that the
content it carries has but little value (234e-235a). When Socrates starts
his first speech he obviously explains the motives behind Lysias' speech,
though without directly mentioning his name (237b)7.
Lysias is trying to fool Phaedrus into pretending not to be himself desirous
for Phaedrus, while he of course is. He is actually attempting to seduce
Phaedrus to grant him his sexual favours by means of his speech that tries
to prove to him the benefits of such a relationship, boldly stating in
so many words that this is the best rational choice one can make serving
one's best interests. But all his deceiving outward rationality and slyness
is just a false cloak, and solely instrumental to his cold inner drive
for immediate sexual satisfaction, trying to make this in some way reasonably
acceptable towards the naive Phaedrus. Later on Socrates will explain that
Lysias' rhetorical skills are not capable to produce any relevant reasonable
knowledge or wisdom, but only lead to contradictory absurdities that Socrates
analyses step by step (262c-264e).
Socrates replies to this with his first speech where he explains, by rationally
defining the nature of desire, that the real immoral effects of maddening
obsessive drives, are caused if one starts a relationship with somebody
whose conduct is solely driven by instinctive and sexual feelings. His
first speech resumes at the end the nature of this type of love relationships
very significantly with the words:" Just as the wolf loves (desires)
his lambs, so the lovers adores his beloved" (241d). In this respect
it could be said that he that does not desire is to be preferred by the
one who is not mad by desire.
However this is only half of the story. Therefore Socrates starts instigated
by his 'inner sign' (242b) to proceed with his definition of 'desire' by
explaining by means of his second speech that the benefits Lysias subscribes
to the so-called non-desirous companion actually belong to the one that
has his passionate desires guided and controlled by his rational
and reasonable desires. This does not mean that the passionate feelings
have to be given up. On the contrary, they will turn out to be essential
for getting the most beneficial relationship. In this context Socrates
defines his passionate 'divine madness' as the one that contrary to the
'mundane and obsessive type' that Lysias described, is the product of a
passionate lover whose conduct however is guided by his rational and reasonable
desires. In fact the companionship with someone with no passionate feelings
at all is to be disregarded by the philosopher and has no moral value (256e-257a).
Socrates formal analysis signifies as the biggest mistake of Lysias' speech
that he gives no truthful definition of desire, but solely identifies 'desire'
with its emotional and instinctive qualities (263d-e). Lysias' one-sided
narrow-minded exposure of desire leads to the absurdities in his speech.
In fact Lysias is portraying with his speech the bad sort of relationship
with no desire at all (243d-e; 256e-257a), with all the qualities of the
good relationship that embeds and cherishes its passionate feelings under
the guidance of the desires of our rational and reasonable faculty.
And using this perspective we can now understand the cunning nature of
Lysias' style of reasoning! He puts all his rhetorical and rational skills
and talents at the service of his sexual desires by persuading and fooling
pretty Phaedrus to have sexual intercourse with him without connecting
this with any true warm-hearted desires, thereby praising evil under the
name of good (260c), and making this somehow reasonably acceptable. It
should be no surprise that Socrates repeatedly urges Lysias to stop writing
this sort of misleading speeches that led his beloved Phaedrus into confusion
and to turn to philosophy, validating Eros in its true sense by means of
philosophical conversations (243d-e; 257b).
Nearly all of Symposium and of the Phaedrus dialogue reflect the same essence
of Plato's conviction about the moral standards that he sees fit for lovers.
Namely the guidance and obedience to our reasonable insights causes sexuality
embedded in true passionate love (the high-spirited desires), care and
faithfulness that will lift the soul up to the 'divine'. Perhaps Plato
thought with regard to homoerotic relations that celibacy was the expression
of the highest possible moral ideals. But he very definitely was no puritan
and considered a sex life that was warm-hearted and did not lose sight
of its natural bounds, to be praised and preferred far above any unemotional
and insatiable sexuality solely pursued for momentary physical gratification.
The same inferior qualities he ascribed to the relationship that contained
no passionate feelings at all. This message I reckon to be universally
valid for all lovers, homosexual or heterosexual, in ancient as in modern
times!
The Phaedrus dialogue is in total agreement with Symposium (206B-209E)
in the way it explains how the erotic desire for immortality causes
the creative productivity of writers (Phaedrus 258d; 277a). This concerns
all kinds of writers like those of political nature, prose or poetry (258d).
The previously exposed 'tricky' duality of desire as constructed out of
the synoptic scheme, is not only applicable to the mechanisms of a love
affair between human beings but also covers the creative literal products
of writers like the speech of Lysias for example. Every time Plato introduces
two different styles of writing, from which the one of them is closely
related to one aspect of Eros, while the other one is closely related to
the other aspect of Eros, according as to that "leading principle" in the
human soul that reigns its conduct as a whole. Plato first connects this
with the two Socratic speeches concerning the lovers but later he relates
it with all writers in general (259e-276a).
Metaphorically Plato tells that the first speech about Eros is spoken through
the mouth of Socrates but origins from Phaedrus, the son of he who is 'Eager
for Fame' (Puqokleoj) and seeks
his home in tempting pleasures (Murrinousioj)
(244a). A few passages earlier Socrates had mentioned the close familiarity
of his first speech with that of Lysias, both speaking of the mundane aspects
of Eros (242d-e). The other speech on the contrary is made by Stesichorus
(Sthsixoroj), son of the 'Man of
Pious Speech' (Eu)fe/moj) of the
town of the 'Desire for Love' ( I((((((meraioj)
(244a). Plato's synoptic classification will later on classify these two
speeches explicitly with the two opposite aspects of Eros (266a).
This bipartition of creative writing will be later on again appropriate
when Plato in his research for 'good writing' will distinguish 'two brothers'
(both being the spiritual children of Erotic creative writing) (276a),
of which one is called 'legitimate' and the other 'illegitimate'. And it
is the ambiguous influence of Eros on the two "leading principles" in the
human soul, that is the cause behind the opposite qualities of the two
different styles of creative writing. Because of the domination of the
emotional, instinctive and irrational 'leading principle' in the soul that
only seeks pleasure, the first (illegitimate) manner of writing originates
using their corrupted rationality. These writers are driven by a desire
to use their rational potential to create their literary works because
of their desire and pursuit for public acknowledgement, fame (257e) or
for financial benefits (266c). Plato subsequently connects this writing
with would-be philosophers, sophists and political orators who are not
aiming for the truth, but only want to gain the favour of the masses with
their 'deceptive persuasiveness' (260a-262c).
The other 'good' half of the speeches is sprung from creative writers who
keep sight of the 'Truth' (276a). These creative writers focus their reasonable
faculties on the Truth, because their conduct is caused by the dominance
of the rational "leading principle" in their soul. They translate the dialectical
and philosophical search for Truth that educates and convinces people on
a proper reasonable way of the truth of their knowledge (265c-274b). These
creative writers plant their knowledge -with its everlasting value-
in people that will lead them to happiness, making these insights thereby
immortal
(277a).
Socrates' last message is directed to the writers of all literary genres
(poets, orators, lawmakers etc.) (278c). With regard to all these different
genres of writing the same 'tricky' bi-polarity of Eros and its creative
forces is decisive for the nature and quality of their creative activities
and offspring. With regard to the writers who focus on the 'Truth' the
term 'philosopher' suits. The other writers (who only write inspired by
their vain desire for fame, or by desire for financial gain, or as with
Lysias to get sexual gratification) will only produce inferior work. Plato
typifies the literary compositions of these kinds of poets, orators or
lawmakers as a product of (artificially) cutting up and gluing together
(278e).
In Symposium Diotima forecasts Socrates a learning process in the 'Mysteries
of Eros' (209a-212b) focussing on the transcending force of Beauty and
rising step by step to an increasingly higher level. It takes of with the
recognition of the transcending beauty of a beautiful body and carries
on to the beauty of laws and social arrangements. Next it carries to the
beauty of knowledge and finally culminates in a mystic vision of the ultimate
transcendent Beauty itself. The Phaedrus dialogue describes in a similar
fashion a vision by all souls of the Ultimate transcendent Beauty in the
"Field of Truth" done in a preemperic existence.
The possibility fairly exists that the gradual discovery of the transcendent
Beauty as schemed in Symposium, could be intrinsically connected with the
gradual recognition and remembrance of the transcendent Beauty as portrayed
in the Phaedrus. However in the Phaedrus dialogue the element of "divine
madness" accompanies this gradual recognition of the transcendent Beauty
in the material reality. We can read how Socrates first seems to be stirred
into a supernatural mantic state of "divine madness" because of his recognition
of the transcendent quality of Beauty in the nature (230b-c; 238c-d). In
Symposium these mantic poeple had been called 'demoniac'. The next form
of divine madness occurs in the story of the lovers. The one who practises
the pederastic and philosophical love relationship, not urged or controlled
by his instinctive desire for physical and sexual gratification, recognises
in the shining beauty of his beloved the transcendent Beauty lifting him
further upwards (249d-e).
The last mystic stage of the recognition of the Ultimate transcendent Beauty
is mentioned in Symposium. Just like in any true and authentic mystic experience
words fail by definition to grasp the notion of that ultimate transcendent
reality with anything we can perceive in the phenomenal material reality;
it is a vision of "Beauty" in its purest transcendental form (210e-211d).
Plato
mentions though at the end of his dialogue the limitations of the written
word in his myth of Theuth who discovered and invented numbers, arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy and writing (274c-275b). The authority of the written
word can give us some sort of enceclopediac knowledge and the false pretence
of wisdom. Ultimately books can not talk back and answer to the questions
and misunderstanding they provoke. Books will always be subjected to all
sorts of misinterpretation leading only to more confusion and its truth
can only be seriously explained by the living words of its author (275e;
278a). They are only an instrument for playfully recollecting wisdom and
insights we already have discovered and are basically not meant for persuading
outsiders (275c-e; 276a; 276d-e). In the Meno dialogue it is shown by Socrates
that true mathematical and geometric knowledge arises not by slavishly
copying opinions of some authority but has to be experienced and realized
within ourselves trough logical discourse with the help of a living teacher.
And it is typical of Plato's style of writing to expose Socrates' teaching
of his insights by means of the rational discussions in his many dialogues
instead of by means of some exposure of authoritative unquestionable convictions.
This will end the general survey of Plato's 'doctrine of Eros' and its
role of development in the human psyche.
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author: Drs. T. J. Kuijl ©1995-1999. Comments are welcome and can be send via e-mail (click on e-mail) Quotations of the content of this article should mention the author's name and its source. Copies of this article must leave the text unaltered including the copyright reference. Dissemination of electronic copies is not allowed. |
1. See in general K.J. Dover, Greek homosexuality, London 1978;
G.R.F. Ferrari, Platonic Love, The Cambridge companion to Plato,
pg. 251.
2. Compare O. D. Duintjer, Over eros en transcendentie bij Plato,
in H. Kunneman and W. Oudemans (red.), Filosofie aan de grens, Assen
1992, pg. 173. Duintjer describes Phaedrus in relation to its homosexual
context and associates the metaphor of the charioteer and his combined
set of horses with the similar image used in the Upanishads
(Katha, 1,3 3-11), but without any acknowledgement of a formal dialectical
and synoptic/dieretic mechanism of classification of 'desire', which he
reckoned to be too unsubstantiated and too farfetched.
3. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics (VI,1,5-6). Aristoteles'
psychology follows Plato's split of the soul in a rational and an irrational
part. Both he most remarkable proceeds in agreement with Plato with a further
differentiation of the rational part of the soul, where a similar function
is ascribed to the logistikon in relation to the scientific part with regard
to the rational operation, as Plato's logistikon in relation to the nous.
Aristotle too recognizes the great similarity with regard to the rational
operation of the logistikon between deliberation and calculation! A bit
further (VI, 2,4) Aristotle tells that choice necessarily involves both
the nous (rational insight) and dianoia (a synonym of logistikon) "nou
kai dianoiaj", together with a certain character (in connection
with a certain particular desire). We can also find a similar split
of the irrational part of the soul in a similar fashion as Plato's dichotomy
(I, XIII, 9-20).
4. Plato uses often logismos (logismoj, logoj)
and other synonyms, all related to discursive reasoning and calculation.
In the Politeia, (IX 580d-581b) and in the Phaedrus (253c)
Plato introduces three leading principles; this should no problem if we
understand that the nous and logistikon represent two distinct but intrinsically
united rational operations that can not function independently but only
as one united "leading principle". Contrary to the high-spirites and instinctive
desires that function autonomous and both have a 'mind' of their own (Timaeus
91b), and as such can be considered to function as two distinct "leading
principles". That is in short the reason why Plato can be found stating
that the soul possesses two or three leading principles, notwithstanding
that it has four capacities.
5. Compare Politeia (VIII 558d-559d) where desires are defined
and their necessity and righteousness is acknowledged, if kept within their
natural bounds.
6. Though R. Hackforts' commentary on the Phaedrus dialogue (Plato's
Phaedrus, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1952) appears
thorough and objective there is no mention made of the homoerotic context
of Plato's definition of morality that pervades the Lysias speech and the
whole of the Phaedrus. Obviously his commentary has the distinguishing
marks of a cultural climate where matters such as homosexuality and sexuality
in general were considered to be a taboo, and therefore were not considered
to be relevant in a scientific discussion about Plato. Socrates refers
to the love relationship between Lysias and Phaedrus explicitly at 236b
and at 279b which Hackford considers to be a "jest" (pg. 9). He calls Hermeias
of Alxandrie's assertion that Lysias and Phaedrus were lovers "quite unfounded"
and concludes that we therefore do not need to bother ourselves about Hermeias
conviction -which seems to be gaining ground!- that the topic of the dialogue
is "peri tou pantapodou kalou fhsin e)inai to
skopon" (9,9). Translated
in English this would be something like: "he says that the subject is about
the beauty in every sense". We only need to read Ferrari's Platonic
Love to see how quickly opinions can change and understand how questionable
the authority of modern academic institutes can be in grasping the truth.
Anyway an objective
and impartial judgement should not be bothered by any 'academic' emotional
and subjective prejudice, on the contrary a true scientific account of
the Phaedrus should impartially and objectively research and study its
emotional context, and can not afford to disregard or ignore such matters
without the risk of ignoring one of its essential features. Hackford's
commentary can therefore be considered to be exemplary historical documentation
of how this
'damnatio memoreae' of the homosexual context of the
Phaedrus dialogue by modern classical commentaries left many matters of
Plato's moral philosophy at least partly unexplained and misunderstood.
Objectivity
and impartiality are no matters to be assumed by authority but again and
again have to be substantiated with a critical search and prove of its
truth. If not it will have the risk of loosing its credibility. This does
not mean that we should disregard any authorities, only that we should
have a higher regard for the truth. However this subject matter is far
too complicated to be sufficiently dealt with in a footnote.
7. Compare Hermeias of Alexandrie who figures the same (9, 30- 10,
4; 50, 1-15). He tells the reason why Lysias is hiding his own desire and
tries to convince Phaedrus to grant his favours to the one who does not
desire him, is because he wants to separate Phaedrus from his admirers
to have him for himself. Nowadays we would associate such an attitude with
the proverb that 'in matters of war and love everything is allowed'.