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a comparison between Tolstoy and Plato by Drs. T. J. Kuijl ©1995-1999 last updated April 29, 1999 |
INTRODUCTION
3.
An introduction into Plato's 'doctrine of Eros'
Tolstoy's description of our religious perception as a guiding and forward
thrusting force behind the coming into existence of art and science can
be compared with Plato's explanation in his dialogues 'Phaedrus and Symposium'
of Eros. Plato's convictions about Eros as stated in the above mentioned
dialogues leave open the possibility to be methodically analysed and logically
structured in terms which make such a 'doctrine of Eros' worthwhile noticing.
The analysis of Eros takes of in the Phaedrus dialogue
by looking at the way in which Plato uses his dialectical survey in his
definition of Eros. It's in the Phaedrus dialogue (265c-266c) that Plato
for the first time explicitly connects this dialectical survey of a definition
of a phenomenon - in this case Eros - with the process of dieresis. This
dieretical method 1 that appears for the first time in
the Phaedrus dialogue can be considered as a primitive forerunner of Aristotle's
later logical classification of genus-species relations of natural objects,
and the syllogisms he constructed with these. Plato considered the search
for this dieretical arrangement of - in his case - transcendent forms that
manifest themselves someway in the natural objects, as the basis of his
scientific and philosophical research.
Two phases are to be considered in this method of definition, that are
both named in the above mentioned passage in the Phaedrus. The first stage
beholds a summarization (sunoyij).
It is during this stage that a general phenomenon in its context of some
sort of primal species - called a genus - is to be defined by analysing
the various specific differentia that derive from this genus. This phase
of the investigation can show us how such a primal species can integrate
in a synthetic unity its contrasting differentia.
Concerning the second stage Plato mentions a method of classification that
aims at constructing several different but kindred definitions. One postulates
a primal species - called a genus - and tries to divide this in its subspecies.
The aim is to continue dividing the genus in further divisions until the
ultimate reality is perceived of what is to be explained by its definition.
One of the most significant differences in this respect with Aristotle
methodical efforts of classification is that Plato's divisions always incorporate
a specific bi-polar contrast. He is therefore always aiming at splitting
the 'genus' up by dichotomy in two each other contrasting specific differentia.
We actually can operate this procedure of 'dieretical definition' using
both the above mentioned passages of the Phaedrus (237d-238a; 265c-266c).
The latter passages very definitely introduces the diëretic phase
of the definition of Eros and connects it with a left side (considered
bad), and a right side (considered good) of Eros. This specific passage
actually refers these two aspects of Eros with two types of 'madness' viz.
an 'divine madness' and negatives 'left side of madness'.
What is most important of this passage (265c-266c!) for
this stage in our research is its reference to an earlier synoptic phase
of defining Eros; this can very definitely be associated with the earlier
mentioned passage (237d-238a). It is there that Socrates starts explaining
about the nature of Eros by defining it as being 'desire' (237d). The meaning
of Eros is therefore equivalent with the Greek verb (e)raw)
from which the word Eros is derived, which actually means 'desiring for'
or 'longing for'. Though this word is used in its most general context
- as a genus -, it still has in Greek the strong sensual connotation of
an 'intense want', and is by no means to be considered as some sort of
passive, lethargic state of being but rather a cause of action2.
The correct literal translation of Eros as 'desire' has to take account
of the negative moral attitude and appreciation in our modern times. Often
the word 'desire' in our language caries a negative 'demonizing' qualification,
which the Greeks - of course - did not have. The Greeks, with their positive
attitude towards life's joys, and their strong appetite and obsession for
physical beauty, did not associate this strong, intense and sensual desire
with any condescending and 'demonizing' tendencies or attitudes, like we
do. This innocent positive inclination towards 'desire' has died out altogether
with the gradual disappearance of the 'Classic civilization', and the subsequent
introduction of Christianity as sole religion, and its moral attitudes
towards 'desire'.
Anyway, the Greek classical civilization in which Socrates and Plato lived,
associated the meaning of the word 'desire' with a positive, intense, sensual
and intellectual 'longing for', that sets people in action. And they saw
it manifested in such a wide variety to include both bodily and emotional
desires, as also our desires for things such as knowledge and wisdom.
Indeed, Socrates immediately connects (237d-238a) his definition of Eros
as 'desire' with two specific and contrasting (!) types of 'desire' in
the human soul. While one part of the soul desires the 'best', the other
on its turn desires 'pleasure'. These two leading principles of the soul
continuously trade places desiring to dominate the other in order to control
the conduct of the soul. It needs no argue that Socrates understood the
two leading principles, to represent on one side our mental and rational
faculties and its desires, while the other side stood for our emotional
and bodily faculties and desires3.
This way both faculties of the soul engage themselves with a different
and contrary psychological domain. One part of the soul engages itself
with its rational scope in a discursive articulation of the truth. The
other part of the soul is focussed at sensory and emotional perception
seeking for pleasure. One could very well say that these two types of 'desire'
are originated from and orientated at the two different and contrary realms
of 'being' and 'becoming'. As such the desires of our mental and rational
capacity are connected with the (transcendent) dimension of 'being', aiming
for truth, while 'desires' of the emotional and bodily faculties are connected
with the (material) dimension of 'becoming', aiming at pleasure. The duality
of Eros with regard to our psychological constitution coincides with Plato's
general philosophical dualistic model of reality.
As has been said before, both psychological leading principles of the soul
trade places in their domination of the conduct of the soul. This means
that if our the bodily and emotional faculty and its desires take charge,
they will enslave us because of their insatiable hunger for pleasure, causing
all sorts of moral decay (237d - 241d). If on the other hand our rational
faculties are in control, the opposite will happen (241e). Desires originating
from that leadership and aiming for the best - truth! -, will bring us
knowledge and wisdom, and all other moral virtues. By this formula a method
for moral conduct is found in a nutshell; by 'rightly' choosing desires
we aim fit for ourselves to live our life by.
One obvious conclusion from this passage (237d-238a) is that both leading
and contrary principles of the soul fall under the same domain of Eros.
Further, this synoptic phase in the Phaedrus has produced a definition
of Eros as a genus and synthetic unity, which incorporates a bi-polar contrast
in the nature of its desire. The following picture is meant to offer a
graphic presentation of this classification. In order to illustrate somehow
the logical structure of Plato's dichotomy, and the phenomena he tries
to explain by these.
The next matter to be discussed is the possibility of a relevant comparison
of the specific content of this synoptic analysis of Eros in the Phaedrus
dialogue, with how Eros is portrayed in Symposium. We therefore need to
discover if and how this subject matter has been dealt with in Symposium.
In Plato's literary and poetic account of Eros in Symposium and Phaedrus,
Eros is produced in a context of homoerotic friendships between men. Both
the Phaedrus and Symposium consider Eros in terms of this human psychic
force -desire-, that is for instance manifest in 'love relationships' amongst
humans. Quite simultaneously Eros is presumed to be some sort of divine
entity; both representations are used simultaneously and appear to be freely
exchangeable.
In Symposium Socrates talks about his knowledge and wisdom of Eros. And
though Socrates always portrays himself in his well known ironic fashion
to be 'ignorant' about anything, he calls Eros the sole subject matter
he has any knowledge about, and even suggests various times knowing the
truth in this matter (177D; 198D; 199A)! He starts his speech about Eros,
not following his own findings, but repeating the 'erotic lessons' given
to him by the priestess Diotima. There he analyses the nature of Eros by
examining its common meaning as human psychic force - desire -.
The search for a definition of Eros starts with a conceptual and syntactical
analysis of desire differentiating the subject and the object of desire.
Socrates reasons that 'that what desires' always desires something. This
entails 'that what desires' is always connected with an 'object of desire'.
That what desires is different from that what is desired, and Eros is that
what desires! This distinction gets us rid of the general confusion that
Eros is itself beautiful because it desires the beautiful. However that
what is desired –the object of desire- is beautiful, but that what desires
–the subject of desire- is not. Finally, this object of desire is by definition
out of reach of its subject of desire. Therefore desire has to be defined
as a longing –by a subject of desire- for something –an object of desire-,
not in our possession, not within our reach, and not at our disposal (200e).
This 'lack' of Eros must not be regarded as some sort of absolute negative
state of total amiss. Eros is emphatically introduced as some sort of intermediary
between immortal and mortal, rich and poor, wisdom and ignorance. What
seems to be the case is that Eros -desire- crosses between these positive
and negative polarities, and produces some kind of intrinsic dynamic connection
between these. Eros as general concept covers both these polarities, by
making these subject and object of desire of each other, and by placing
itself in the middle. In other words: Diotima proposes some sort of 'system
of polarities' that are intrinsically interconnected because of the intermediary
role of Eros. This can be shown with the next illustration.
'it is necessarily so that what desires desires what it misses, whilst it doesn't desire what it doesn't miss' (200A)4.
If desire must be directed at something not being in our possession etc,
we must have some notion of this object of desire, just to be capable to
desire. The poor who desires to be rich for instance, must have some idea
of what richness is to feed this desire. These bi-polar contraries that
coincide with the subject and object of desire chair some sort of intrinsic
logical unity, that for instance could be translated and clarified in dynamic
concepts like that of potentiality and actuality, making Eros the middle-man.
The man who is actually poor has a potential for richness, and therefore
desires this. So desire could be defined as a bi-polar longing for something,
for which we have a potential to posses, a potential to get within our
reach, and a potential have at our disposal, but that is not actually in
our possession, etc.. Or one could define 'desire' simply as a bi-polar
longing for something that we don't have in our possession etc., but of
which we have some sort of notion. And if we are in possession of what
we desire, we desire to remain in possession of this for always. If we
are for instance wealthy we desire to remain wealthy.
Socrates continues his explanation of Eros identifying it metaphorically
with a 'demon', some sort of mythical semi-divine being. Repeating Diotima's
deep and mysterious lessons, the bi-polar nature and capacity of this 'demon'
is portrayed using the following words:
"Interpreting and transporting human things to the Gods and divine things
to men; entreaties and sacrifices from below, and ordinances and requitals
from above: being midway between, it makes each to supplement the other,
so that the whole is combined in one.
Through it are conveyed all divination and priestcraft
concerning sacrifice and ritual and incantations, and all soothsaying and
sorcery. God does not mingle with man: but the demonic is the means of
all society and converse of men with Gods and Gods with men, whether waking
or asleep" (202e-203a)5.
This 'demon', a mythical semi-divine entity, can quite well be interpreted
as a metaphoric transfiguration and 'divination' of this 'psychic force'
called desire. Especially if we realize that in the Greek culture of that
time 'psyche' was a concept not solely restricted to us humans, but that
extended to the realm of the transcendent. The metaphor figures Eros' nature
as 'demon' to be some sort of a bridge between the two ontological separate
and contrary levels of 'reality', with the capacity to transport something
from one side to the other. And this bridge carries messages coming from
both directions! Therefore the Gods get their 'ordinances and requitals'
across their ontological ridge to that of mankind, by desire. And vice
versa: mankind gets their 'entreaties and sacrifices' across their ontological
ridge to that of the Gods, by desire.
Its quite obvious that Plato produces with this 'demoniac' metaphor two
opposite types of 'desire'. One kind of desire is to be associated with
the 'divine' as origin and content, the other with the 'mundane of mankind'
as origin and content. The content of the messages of the 'divine type
of Eros' exists of 'divine' ordinances and requitals; this means in other
words a 'divine' desire to control and reward. The content of the messages
of the 'mundane type of Eros' has 'mundane' entreaties and sacrifices';
this refers to a 'mundane' desire to ask and receive from the Gods.
This interpretation actually uncovers reference to Eros as origin of two
different and opposite psychological motives of action. When the Gods act
out to mankind they are not motivated by any necessity or need to do so.
They reach out to mankind with their ordinances because they 'desire' to
do so. Their desire expresses the voluntary character of their action,
done not because of any necessity but out of free will. It's quite the
opposite way with the desires of mankind. They are begging the Gods out
of need and necessity for knowledge and material goods, and they desire
these because they have a constant 'lack' of them in their 'ontological
realm of becoming'.
Also this interpretation does stay true to the factual content of the dialogue,
and enlightens the metaphor by exposing its logical and poetic simplicity
and evidence. By all means, this 'demonic metaphor of Eros' reveals both
the brilliance of Plato's literary and poetic genius, and the sharpness
of his logical and philosophical reasoning. It might open the possibility
to breach the 'gap' many scholars6 felt in analysing
the rational structure of Diotima's lessons arriving at this part of the
metaphor. It could be said that this aspect of the methaphor with regard
to the 'demoniac' nature of Eros is essential for getting any grip on Plato's
logical extortion on desire.
The metaphor continues by referring the origin and descent of this demon
'Eros'. The myth of his descent from father Abundance (Poroj)
and mother Shortage (Penia) again
exemplifies the innate and unified polarity of its nature (203A). Father
Abundance is especially mentioned to be a direct descendant of 'Knowledge';
therefore his father Abundance inherited this Demon Eros desires originating
from, and related to the knowledgeable and rational. His mother Shortage
is portrayed to be begging in a continuos extreme need for especially material
goods and commodities; therefore his mother Shortage inherited this Demon
Eros desires originating from, and related to the material and mundane.
Eros is conceived on the day of birth of Aphrodite, something the myth
mentions as cause for Eros' innate attraction to beauty. Both types of
'Eros', though contrary to each other, desire beauty in their own domain.
There is a desire for intellectual beauty like wisdom, such as there is
a desire for sensuous beauty.
Playfully
the metaphor unwinds the bi-polar nature of 'the demon Eros' using the
concepts of Abundance and Shortage. In a poetic manner it enumerates in
direct relation to these the two kinds of 'desire' (203C-D). Because of
Eros' inheritance of his mothers' nature -Shortage- he produces desires
related with our necessary material needs, like that for food, clothing
and shelter (203c). Because of Eros' inheritance of his fathers' nature
-Abundance- he produces desires related with the knowledgeable and rational
(203d). The metaphor enumerates amongst others twice a desire for wisdom.
His typecasting as 'hunter for the beautiful and the good, seems to suggest
some sort of strategic and deliberate strive that is just like his 'courageousness'
a product of desires guided by the knowledgeable and rational. In Plato's
Phaedrus (237d-238a) both these kind of 'desires' have been attributed
to one of the 'leading principles' in the soul what proves their coherence
so far.
Next the concepts of Abundance and Shortage focus their significance on
the status of human knowledge (203E-204B). It strikes how the double nature
of the demon Eros is in a constant dynamic flux between 'being full to
overflowing', and 'standing with empty hands'. In this respect the philosopher
is situated between the completely ignorant and the Gods in what seems
a constant flux between these polarities. As has been defined before, a
desire is aimed at something of which we have some sort of notion, but
that is not in our possession, etc. The metaphor reinstates from this definition
of Eros, that the Gods do not desire wisdom, because they already have
wisdom.
One the other opposite side of the scale the totally ignorant are situated.
Their utter ignorance is caused by a complete lack of desire for wisdom.
Their absolute preoccupation for their 'bodily' desires cuts them from
any possible desire deriving from their knowledgeable and rational faculty
of the soul, making them 'immune' for perceiving any lack of knowledge
by their desire. Both groups are situated at the extreme opposite sides,
representing in the most absolute way ' Eros' demonic nature' of Abundance
and Shortage with regard to the opposite motives of not-desiring knowledge.
The philosophers are the only of the three groups possessing a desire for
knowledge! Obviously the state of not-desiring of the Gods is caused by
their most extreme Abundance of knowledge, the state of not-desiring of
the totally ignorant is due to their absolute Shortage of knowledge, viz.
their absolute preoccupation with material desires and consequently the
absence of any rational desire.
The philosopher is like Eros itself (!), situated between and connected
with both opposites of ignorance and wisdom. By definition a desire goes
out to that of which we have some sort of notion but that is actually not
in our possession. Therefore Eros as a desire for the beautiful such as
wisdom implies ignorance. At this manner Eros is in the middle of ignorance
(Shortage) and wisdom (Abundance).
The philosopher too desires for beauty and wisdom, and
is therefore faced with the same situation as Eros. Like Eros his ignorance
can be deduced from his desire for wisdom, putting them both in the same
perspective with regard to ignorance and wisdom.
One could say that the philosopher personifies the definition of the nature
of Eros with regard to ignorance (Shortage) and wisdom (Abundance). Such
a definition of 'desire' unveils our ignorance, and stimulates our desire
for wisdom, leading to philosophy. Or to be more precise: the demoniac
perception of wisdom and ignorance brings the philosopher to live. The
philosopher, who grasps the correct definition of Eros concerning human
knowledge, can say to have some sort of reasoned knowledge of ignorance,
deducing it from his desires for wisdom. Such a person truly knows that
he doesn't have any wisdom, because he desires ((wisdom), and because he
understands the nature and cause of his desire!). It is surely by understanding
the formal implications concerning his ignorance and desire of wisdom that
the philosopher reasons his resemblance with this demon Eros.
It is worth noticing that the final passage explaining the nature of the
demon Eros (204C) returns to earlier mentioned basic premises of the definition
of 'desire' by stating not to confuse the beauty of what we desire, with
that what desires. The distinction between the subject and the object of
desire comes this time with reference to Eros parents, viz. Poroj
and Penia. There had already been
concluded in this respect at the beginning of the discussion with Agathon
that "it is necessarily so that what desires desires what it misses,
while it doesn't desire what it doesn't miss" (200A).
Well considered the subject and the object of desire fit the bi-polar character
of the parentage of Abundance and Shortage that are contrary but logically
alternating to each other. Their parentage in the metaphor proves that
both are innate to the nature of desire itself. Both are needed to bring
desire into existence and give it so to speak life. The nature of desire
itself is like a coin with two sides facing opposite directions. The subject
of desire implies the existence of an object of desire; an object of desire
implies the existence of a subject of desire. At the very beginning of
his search for a definition of ‘desire’ Socrates linked as example the
essential and syntactical features of the words 'father' and ‘brother’
with such a intrinsic logical relation (199e). A brother for instance is
by definition always a brother of someone. Therefore being a brother implies
having a brother or sister; there is actually someone being the object
of my ‘brotherhood’. Being a brother implies having brothers or sisters;
not having any brothers or sister implies not being a brother. The same
argument is valid with regard to the concept 'father'; being a father implies
having children and vice versa (199d). Having a desire for knowledge implies
not having any knowledge.
The subject/object distinction of for instance 'desire' might very well
also be related to what Plato would consider its 'activity and passivity'.
The subject of desire -'that what desires'- could be reckoned to be named
its activity. Being an object of desire -'that what is desired'- could
be termed as its passivity. The Cratylus dialogue uses the same instrument
of analysing a phenomenon by regarding its activity and passivity (386a-386b).
Earlier Diotima (202a) had already reasoned the knowledge of the philosopher
to be in the middle of ignorance and wisdom. She had called it the 'correct
opinion', meaning a type of unreasoned understanding not being 'full knowledge',
but being better than ignorance because it 'hits the truth'. This 'correct
opinion' correlates with the mixed nature of the 'erotic' knowledge of
the philosopher. His understanding of the true nature of Eros makes him
hit the truth about wisdom and ignorance, and makes him value a desire
for wisdom and philosophy. However from this desire for wisdom his ignorance
can be logically deduced, thereby making the content of his knowledge quite
limited. In other words: we reasonably know that we don't know, but what
we don't know, we can not reason.
Eros
is as far as the philosopher is concerned continuously fluctuating between
Shortage and Abundance. With respect to the totally ignorant desiring but
pleasure, the philosopher surely is to be identified with demoniac 'Abundant',
while the former is to be identified with the demoniac 'Shortage'. The
wisdom of the Gods, of course is the zenith of demonic 'Abundance. In relation
to the God's wisdom, the philosophers' knowledge surely is to be identified
with a demonic 'Shortage'.
We could ask ourselves the question how Diotima got her truth about this
demonic nature of Eros. Symposium does not say anything about this specific,
but just posits her as a wise woman of Mantinea who teaches lessons of
Eros. The name of her hometown suggests some connection with prophetic
knowledge, just as the reference by Socrates of her help stopping the plague
one time in Athens by some sort of ritual sacrifice. Her metaphoric definition
of the demonic nature Eros indeed discusses this kind of prophetic practice
and wisdom.
"Through it are conveyed all divination and priestcraft concerning sacrifice and ritual and incantations, and all soothsaying and sorcery. God does not mingle with man: but the demonic is the means of all society and converse of men with Gods and Gods with men, whether waking or asleep" (202e-203a).
This would mean that the Gods teach their wisdom to mankind by means of
these 'mantic' people, because of their desire to do so. Diotima's wisdom
is in this respect, next to her own desire for wisdom, caused by this desire
of the Gods, or in other words by the will of the Gods. The Gods' desire
to teach us humans wisdom is not in any way to be connected with any Shortage,
need or necessity on their side. Their desires in relation to wisdom flow
forth from their Abundance and are focussed, contrary to man's desires,
not on getting and obtaining, but on giving and distributing wisdom.
As far as teaching is concerned the same could be said of the desires concerning
knowledge of Diotima and Socrates. Their position though truly appears
to be 'demoniac' by showing both Shortage and Abundance in their desires
concerning wisdom. With regard to their desire for obtaining wisdom they
prove their Shortage of knowledge as 'students' of their erotic master.
As teachers of their wisdom of Eros they show their Abundance of knowledge
that makes them desire to teach and distribute this wisdom, not by any
need or necessity but out of free will. It is probable that Socrates never
asked money for his teachings because of this aspect; he had done it freely
out of a favour for his friends.
Often Eros has been solely identified in modern times with its Shortage
motivated desire for getting and obtaining something. This has been put
often in contrast with the Christian concept of Love, which figured its
moral superiority to be caused by its unconditional desire to give to others.
The Platonic concept of Eros appears to include the same unconditional
and strictly unnecessary desire to give that proves its moral prestige
to be rather underestimated and misunderstood.
Symposium is actually a frame story told by someone called Appollodorus
who is obviously an admirer of Socrates. During his introduction of the
actual story of the meeting he very proudly shows of the relevance of his
knowledge of ignorance (173c-d). Other peoples proud themselves with the
vain illusion of having achieved something, although they've achieved nothing
in reality. They may think that Appollodorus and his philosophy have achieved
nothing, Appollodorus on his turn states emphatically not just to think,
but to know for sure that they and his own person have achieved nothing.
This passage I reckon to forecast the later 'demoniac' knowledge of ignorance.
This 'demoniac reasoning' also 'rings a bell' with respect to Socrates'
famous educational phases called elenchus and protreptics. In Plato's Apology
Socrates explains his motives for employing these two stages that are uniquely
associated with his specific style of philosophy. The first step entails
a shattering of our illusion to have any knowledge (Apology 21c-24a). The
student has to realize that he not any relevant knowledge in his possession.
In his discussions Socrates very successfully cripples any false conceit
of knowledge present with his opponents, claiming to know nothing himself.
All of this didn't make Socrates particularly loved by people whose pride
about their knowledge got hurt by the 'evidence' of his reasoning. And
it can not be denied that a lot of time this attitude revealed on a painful
manner their false conceit of wisdom and shows the distinguishing marks
of somebody privileged with a superior knowledge (Apology 34e).
The second phase of his education must make the student realize that the
route to wisdom starts with inciting a search for knowledge. This search
for knowledge will cause a desire for wisdom, leading to philosophy, knowledge
and morality. What better way of educating the student these preliminary
two stages then explaining him the nature and implications of Eros, viz.
Shortage and Abundance? In the Apology Socrates explains the origin of
his philosophical mission and method by referring to the outcome of the
Delphi oracle, which called him the wisest of all men. He uses the God
as witness of his 'human wisdom' to know nothing (Apology 20e). There is
no direct mention made in this respect by him to his knowledge of the nature
of this 'Great Demon Eros'; quite understandable perhaps for someone defending
himself against the accusation of introducing some sort of 'private demon'
as a new God in Athens. And is it just a coincidence that in Symposium
this wise woman Diotima with her lessons of Love has been referred to as
a stranger coming from far away?
Summarizing one could say that the nature of Eros had been defined as a
bi-polar desire for something (beautiful) we have some sort of notion of,
but which is not within our reach (203D). Its bi-polarity manifested itself
in two aspects. First the bi-polarity of the contraries was mentioned with
regard to the subject and object of desire in a 'relative context'. For
example the poor who desires to be rich, or the ignorant who wishes to
be wise. On the other hand this bi-polarity of desire can be associated
with the ontological and epistemological diversity with regard to its specific
psychological domain. There are those desires originating from and related
with our mental and rational capacities, and there are those originating
from and related with our physical constitution.
The demoniac metaphor uses the words Abundance and Shortage for both these
types of contraries, the first in a relative context, the latter in an
absolute. Desires originating from and related with our physical constitution
are to be associated with need and necessity (involuntary desires). Those
originating from and related with our mental and rational capacities were
associated with deliberation and free will (voluntary desires). Both the
relative and absolute aspects do not exist totally separate from each other
but are intertwined in some 'system of polarities'.
A more
formal analysis could state that desire is the cause of our actions. On
the other hand on could say that the demoniac nature of desire has produced
distinctions that tell us 'how and why we act'; viz. because out of lack
or abundance (relative aspect) and because of our rational or emotional
desires (absolute aspect)7.
After Diotima has finished the definition of the nature of Eros she proceeds
by defining its ‘works’ (e)rgon).
As had been said in the beginning of Socrates’ speech the essence of Eros
has to be understood by seeking its nature and works, viz. what is Eros
and what does it do (204d). The discussion proceeds in finding that our
desire is no lethargic passive longing, but a strong urge to get something
(the beautiful) in our possession. The Phaedrus dialogue too associates
Eros with a striving force that aims at getting its desires fulfilled (238c).
Diotima extends the object of desire from just the beautiful (in its wide
variety of appearance) to the good. And she further explains it is because
of the acquisition of the beautiful and the good that we get our satisfaction
(Politeia IV, 437c). We could rephrase Eros’ definition with regard to
its relative context as a intense desire, with the potential for acquisition
and satisfaction because it has some notion what it desires, but doesn't
actually hold possession of it.
The two different psychological fields of desire connected with its absolute
context show a broad range in the content of the beautiful and the good.
There are those desiring money, physical beauty and wisdom, all considering
this to be the ‘beautiful and good’ for them. Though the term ‘lovers’
is in our common language only attributed to those having ‘love affairs’,
in fact all are lovers who desire the beautiful and the good to get satisfaction
in some respect (Symposium 205d) (Politeia IV, 438d-439a).
In agreement with her previous words (200d) Diotima tells we desire continuation
of our possession of the beautiful and the good. The object desire therefore
is having the good for always in its possession (206a). For this purpose
a specific type of activity is needed which has to be instrumental in acquiring
‘this everlasting possession of the good’. In this context Diotima describes
Eros’ works (e)rgon) as a creative
impulse called the begetting on a beautiful thing by means of both the
body and soul (206b-207g). Again the previously introduced bi-polar character
marks the ‘works’ of Eros in a 'relative and absolute' manner. Eros posits
in man as mortal being a desire for immortality, viz. having life for always
in possession. For we desire that what we do not have in our possession,
but have some notion of. Eros is therefore, as has been said before, in
the middle of mortal and immortal. Immortality is actually not meant so
much as a tautological ‘not dying’, but rather refers to its implication
of the everlasting continuation of life. On the other hand it can be said
that its absolute context is exemplified by 'begetting on the beautiful'
in two different ontological realm, viz. in body or soul.
At this point we can also conclude that the bi-polar concept of mortality
and immortality is exemplary for the absolute and relative dimensions of
desire. First it can be related with the two different ontological and
epistemological domains, viz. our rational and emotional desires (Symposium
203E). Secondly it can be formulated in its relative context with
regard to a subject and object of desire; the mortal who desires immortality
during the act of 'begetting in the beautiful'.
This strife for immortality shows its 'absolute bi-polarity' through the
begetting in beauty ‘by means of body and soul’. On the biological plane
this manifest itself through means of physical procreation. Other peoples
posses their fertility in their mental and rational capacities. Their aim
is obtaining immortal glory for eternity through mental and rational ‘procreation’.
However Diotima adjust her definition of our desire for the beautiful.
It is not so much the beautiful itself what we desire, as rather we desire
it to use it for procreation. Just as the farmer does not desire his fields
because of their own merit, but rather desires these to raise his crops
in. In fact this crop is the prime target of his desire, while his desire
for the field is based on its instrumental capacity for obtaining this
prime target. A more precise explanation of Eros’ creative impulse would
be a desire for ‘the begetting in beauty of the good through body and soul’.
Comparative notions of this teleological subdivision an instrumental act
aiming at a final goal with regard to desire are also to be found in the
Lysis (218d-220b) or in the Gorgias (467c-468b).
Eros incites us to procreate in the beautiful that what we as it were already
carry latently in us. According to one’s specific constitution we desire
and seek the beautiful to procreate physical or spiritual children. When
people are fertile at the physical level they will desire to obtain continuation
of life by means of their desire for procreation with a beautiful partner.
In such a manner a man's desire to make love to a beautiful woman is instrumental
to his ultimate aim and desire to procreate offspring. Through their offspring
all living beings will try to leave a lasting remembrance of their life.
So on a physical level mortals desire to obtain immortality and continuation
of life by means of desiring procreating children – new life- in a beautiful
partner. This phenomenon reaches out to all animals, that all reveal -consciously
or unconsciously!- this drive for immortality by means of desiring procreation
of offspring, and by their readiness to protect this even with their own
life (207b-d). So this desire for immortality turns up to be most dominant
and most prevailing in the whole of living nature.
People who are fertile on a spiritual and mental level will desire to procreate
‘in beautiful writing’ their children in the shape of insights (and any
other form of virtue), which will give them immortal glory. All poets and
creative artist fall within his category. The homosexual philosophical
friendships show also the distinguishing marks of this mental and spiritual
fertility. Here the elder male lover desires a beautiful young man out
of a desire to procreate wisdom in his soul.
The most renowned and beautiful insights procreated in 'beautiful writing'
take up the form of social arrangements, and are called wisdom and justice.
Diotima tells that these spiritual children, who we driven by Eros procreate
in the beautiful, posses a greater beauty and immortality than ‘physical
children’ (209C). The poets reveal their insights in the beauty of their
art. Homer and Hesiod have acquired immortal glory with their descendants
in the form of literary works. The same has been said of Lycurgus and Solon
who reveal their wise and just insights to posterity through their excellent
laws. In short in Symposium Eros has been described as the guiding and
creative impulse that drives and inspires poets, philosophers and other
wise men to procreate and reveal their insights in their literal work.
The virtues and wisdom of Socrates as portrayed in Plato's dialogues are
not solely meant to be mere historical documentation. They rather act as
to remind us as lively as possible how Socrates' moral attitude was fit
to be a 'eternal roll model' by its expression of everlasting transcendent
ideals. These moral virtues that Socrates as living sage embodied were
connected with eternity by being essential and decisive for any possible
reoccurrence of such a given situation.
Reading Symposium one could imagine Plato's description of the desire for
immortality in relation with moral virtues like bravery to be quite selfish
and egocentric (208c-d). The 'good' that is achieved in beautiful brave
acts is the immortal glory as a courageous man. As if brave acts were merely
done by a hero to earn for himself a name as such in posterity. Though
the actual literal text only mentions this as sole motive power for action,
one should take account of the full perspective of Plato's doctrine to
grasp the deeper meaning of this example of moral virtue. It could be said
that this example rather shows what 'beautiful' acts of bravery are done
in battle by someone to save the life of his lover, because he 'desires'
his lover to survive and live on. The fame and glory of his brave acts
in battle are just an eternal proof of his willingness for self-sacrifice
and end result of his love that made him do this. A calculating judgement
would not result in risking one's own life to save the others', especially
if the desire for continuation of one's own life is so dominant. It rather
appears that the hero desires risking his own physical continuation of
life, and desires to safeguard and continue the life that of his beloved,
because he desires a non-physical immortality in the form of 'eternal glory'
produced by love.
Another angle of approach for explaining this passage would be a comparison
with the earlier mentioned universal desire of all living beings to take
care of their offspring at risk of losing their own life. Parents would
be willing because of their desire of immortality to risk their own life
to save that of their offspring. All considered this would have the same
consequences: parents are willing to put their own physical life at stake,
because they wish for the continuation of the physical life of their (beloved)
offspring, and out of desire for their own non-physical 'generic' immortality.
Diotima tells literally that this desire for self-sacrifice of living beings
could be understood if they were able to rationally consider this (206b-c).
Therefore in the case of rational human beings the conscious desire for
self-sacrifice out of the wish for continuation of the life of a beloved
definitely seems to make sense.
Yet even another explanation of this desire for immortal
glory could be deduced from the 'demoniac principle of polarities'. Reckoning
'shame' to be the opposite of 'glory' one could say that Eros is in the
middle of shame and glory. Using one of Diotima earliest examples: the
poor doesn't desire continuation of his present state because of its 'Shortage'
and therefore strives to its opposite to become rich. Analogue to this
a desire for glory could have its cause in not-desiring shame. The hero
would strive for glory out of fear for shame in the eyes of his beloved
and all other people.
Actually this kind of homosexual 'bonding'
of soldiers was deliberately encouraged in classical Greece in some armies,
incited by the same argument. Using the knowledge Socrates got from Diotima,
the story gets a new dimension. The desire for continuation of life is
not limited to one's own life, one desires the life of the other to continue
just as much, or sometimes even more when a loved one is concerned. The
will to risk one's own life in battle to safe the life of one's beloved
was therefore valued to be a moral virtue, viz. bravery. The glory pursued
was not motivated by a vain thirst for fame or because of disregarding
their own life, but by a desire to prove one's love for one's beloved,
setting an virtuous example fit for posterity.
People like Socrates had proven in their life by the deeds they did to
represent virtues like bravery, and were therefore fit to be roll models
for generations to come. Socrates did not feel any egocentric or selfish
'need' for a public award for his brave acts in saving the live of his
friend Alkibiades during battle, nor did he show any fear for dying (220d-e).
Instead he saved the life of his beloved Alkibiades and choose him to receive
the award of honour, again giving someone else out of love some strain
of immortal(ity) glory and fame..
Summarizing this whole introduction of what I have called Plato's 'doctrine
of Eros' one can conclude that this apparently covers both Plato's Phaedrus
and Symposium in a systematic and analytical description and definition
of 'desire'8. This synoptic phase will again be
used as stepping stone for a further expansion of this doctrine in its
dieretic phase. There it will be argued how and which desires operate in
the different domains of the human psyche. All of this has to result in
a clear and coherent explanation of Plato's opinions about 'right moral
conduct' and its implications for art and science. Our previous findings
match the next illustration.
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1. E. de Stryker, Beknopte geschiedenis van de antieke filosofie,
Baarn 1980, pg. 104.
2. Politeia IV, 437b-c. Here Plato describes 'desire' in similar
terms as a strive for pursuit and also its opposite 'non-desiring' as an
intent of rejection. Aristotle refers to 'desire' and its contrary 'anger'
as causes for action (Rhetorics 1369a).
3. In Politeia IV, 437e-439d we can percieve the same bi-polar classification.
First 'desire' is being termed as a genus concept (437e-438a) to be followed
up with a split in two contrary types of desire. One of them is specified
with our reasonable faculty in our soul leading up to deliberative 'calculations
of reason' (439d). The other is identified with irrationl desires that
are later on again split in two contrary types: the instinctive and the
high-spirited 'qumoj'(439d-e).
In the Gorgias (513d) we can find in comparable terms the same split between
aiming
for 'the best' and aiming for 'pleasure' though in another context, which
should be no problem if we understand 'desire' to be an universal concept
and cause for action.
4. Symposium translation by W.R.M. Lamb of the Loeb Classical library.
5. Idem.
6. Dr.S.J. Ridderbos, Eros bij Plato, Kok Agora, Kampen 1988,
pg.38.
Goethe:"Wer der Dichter will verstehen, muss in Dichters' Land gehen".
7. Compare Aristotle, Rhetorics 1369a.
8. The only commentary of the Phaedrus dialogue that has survived from
antiquity comes from Hermeias of Alexandria, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia,
edited by Paul Couvreur, Georg Olms Verlag 1971. Hermeias too identifies
discussing Phaedrus 237b7 (pg. 52, 1-7) the same genus concept with regard
to a definition of Eros and two types of desire; one rational the other
irrational. Later on reffering to Phaedrus 238c5 and discussing the
context of this genus concept of Eros with its double qualification and
the hegemonistic struggle for domination in the soul, Hermeias (pg. 53,
23- pg. 54, 4) associates Eros with the general force that as 'middle man'
chaines and connects these two opposite elements that internally exist
in the soul, thereby implying its demoniac capacity. He seeks evidence
in Plato's Cratylus 398d7 where Eros is ethymologically explained with
the verbs ei)rein(chain)
and desmein(connect).