From: <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988310.ece">Aftenposten</a><br>
Date: 4.1.2010
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S E C R E T TOKYO 000011 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI, EAP/J, SCA/CEN 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2035
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, KZ, JA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER 
REF: A. ASTANA 02273 B. ASTANA 02257 C. STATE 131723 
Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 

1. (S) Acting EMIN delivered the demarche and non-paper
contained in ref C to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Deputy Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and
Science Akihito Nakajima January 4. (Note: The Government of
Japan had been officially closed since December 29 for New
Years holidays, delaying our delivery of this demarche. End
note.) Without getting into details of Astanas discussions
with the government of Kazakhstan, A/EMIN also made him aware
of Kazakhstans strong denials on this issue by sharing a copy
of the December 30 public statement from the GOK.

2. (S) Nakajima expressed appreciation for the information and
said MOFA would look into the transaction, including by
consulting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industrys
(METI) colleagues. He requested any additional information the
USG could provide, especially that which relates to the status
of the transaction and the dates of the shipment. Nakajima
said the GOJ understands that Iran will soon run out of
yellowcake, and has expected Iran to search for another
source. He suggested there will be a continued need to keep a
look out for this type of transfer in the future.

3. (S) Econoff also delivered separately the demarche and
nonpaper to METIs Security Export Control and Trade Control
Policy Divisions. These offices are typically responsible for
investigations into Japanese companies on security and export
control issues, and likely will coordinate the GOJ
investigation with MOFA. Since press articles about the
uranium transfer have not included any details on East Asia
Limited or Baiken-Us involvement, METI officials were
unfamiliar with the issue and initially confused by our
request to discuss a uranium transfer involving Iran. However,
once made aware of the potential role of a Japan-owned firm,
Security Export Control Division Director of International
Affairs Masaaki Takabatake said that his office would begin an
immediate investigation. He noted his office was unfamiliar
with the companies involved, but would work with METIs nuclear
energy division, which should already have the required
corporate contacts.

4. (SBU) Post will provide updates on the results of GOJ
investigations as soon they are received. We would welcome any
additional information that can be shared with the GOJ on this
issue.

ROOS
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